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I am delighted to introduce this important and timely paper written by a 
scholar with distinguished credentials and strong connections to the military 
and the Naval War College. Dr. Nordquist holds a doctorate in juridical science 
from the University of Virginia and earned a diploma in international law at 
Cambridge, where he attended Grey's Inn of Court. After active duty in the 
us. Marines, including service in Vietnam, he joined the State Department as 
an attorney and legislative counsel. Leaving government service for several years 
of private practice, he later returned to become Deputy General Counsel of 
the US. Air Force, serving as Acting General Counsel for six months in 1993. 
Since August of that year he has been a professor oflaw at the US. Air Force 
Academy. In 1995-96 he was the Charles H. Stockton Professor ofInternational 
Law at the Naval War College. It was in that academic year that he produced 
this Newport Paper. 
Dr. Nordquist's study reviews past pea cekeeping operations and the aspects 
of the Charter of the United Nations that govern the use of force. He proposes 
that. given the end of the Cold War, distinctions in the UN Charter framework 
between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions can and ought to be 
reflected in future Security Co uncil peacekeeping mandates. He also offers 
realistic peace-enforcement scenarios illustrating how updated mandates might 
operate. 
This overview of the Charter and the challenges of modern peace operations 
provides a better understanding of the legal and inst itutional nature of the 
Security Council. of why existing peacekeeping mandates now lack consistency, 
and of the importance of dealing with these issues. 
Dr. Nordquist's work exemplifies the purposes of our Newport Papers 
senes-it is current, insightful and relevant . I commend it to those policy makers 
who will shape the peace operations of the future as well as the milit ary 
commanders and their staffs who will carry them out . 
Rear Admiral, US. Navy 
President, Naval War College 
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Introduction 
This study is divided into five chapters. The first focuses on the legal 
framework for peacekeeping and enforcement operations under the United 
Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. The general approach here is 
an article-by-article review of the pertinent texts, without delving into nuances 
of meaning or legislative history. An occasional prescriptive comment will be 
made in relevant context, but by and large the fundamental idea is that an 
overview of the Charter's principles and rules will facilitate a better under­
standing of the legal and institutional framework in which the Security Council 
issues peacekeeping mandates. As will be shown, much of the confusion over 
current peacekeeping practice lies in inadequately considered departures from 
what States actually agreed to do in the United Nations and Nato. Chapter II 
is a brief summary of the forty peacekeeping operations in which the United 
Nations engaged from June 1948 through the end of 1995. Again, to foster a 
reform-minded policy outlook, only a skeletal description of the mandate for 
each UN peacekeeping operation is given. Marshaling such an outline of 
peacekeeping operations is instructive in that even the bare recitation of this 
fifty years of practice reveals a remarkable range of exper iences. It is easy to 
discern why Security Council mandates on peacekeeping lack consistency. 
Chapter III of this study contains an analysis of UN peacekeeping practice and 
of key points that ought to be dealt with in reformulating traditional peacekeep­
ing and enforcement actions under Security Council mandates. In Chapter IV, 
several scenarios are presented to illustrate how properly mandated peacekeep­
ing and enforcement operations might work in the post-Cold War era. To 
emphasize the critical distinctions between different use of force mandates and 
the corresponding legal status of the individuals involved, the illustrations refer 
to white, blue, and green helmet participants. Chapter V of this study proposes 
a few suggestions to improve Security Council mandates for "mixed" traditional 
peacekeeping and enforcement actions. 
A threshold comment is needed for clarification about the use of the term 
"peacekeeping" in this study W hen the term appears alone, it refers to the great 
variety of activities that have been mandated and therefore formally designated 
as "peacekeeping" operations. As will be explained, peacekeeping is a generic 
label that, inter alia, obscures an important legal distinction between traditional 
peacekeeping and enforcement actions. Fuzzy definitions can be useful for 
shorthand communication, but they can also contribute to fuzzy thinking. From 
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a legal perspective, it is important to know what is meant by the term 
"peacekeeping." However, efforts to use more precise words with better defined 
meanings may also pose problems. For instance, the term "peace enforcement" 
is now heard and often seen in the literature. While this is an understandable 
effort to distinguish operations based on consent from those that are not, the 
term is not taken from the Charter, is ill-defmed in actual practice, and is logically 
inconsistent as a phrase. The approach prefer red in this study is to use words 
taken from the text of the Charter or with an agreed meaning in State practice. 
However, bowing to overwhelming usage, an exception to this preference for 
precise language is made in the case of the term "peacekeeping." Accordingly, 
the term is used in this study generically to cover the entire spectrum of activities 
ranging from traditional peacekeeping to enforcement actions. Finally, a cut-off 
date is necessary for publication purposes. Unless otherwise indicated, the date 
used for this study is 31 December 1 995 . 
I 
UN Charter and North Atlantic Treaty 
�HE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS entered into force on 24 
Jl October 1945. Amendments to Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter were 
adopted by the General Assembly and came into force on 31 August 1965. The 
only other Charter amendments-to Article 61 (enlarging the Economic and 
Social Council) and to Article 109 (relating to a review of the Charter)-are 
not germane to this study 
The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security 
Council from eleven to fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions 
of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine Members (formerly seven). Decisions of the Security Council on 
all other matters require an afErmative vote of nine Members, including the 
concurring votes (which may be abstentions) of the five Permanent Members. 
Chapter I of the Charter consists of two articles outlining the purposes of 
the United Nations. Article 1 (1) reads: "To maintain international peace and 
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression 
or other breaches of the peace .... " Paragraph 21ists developing friendly relations 
among nations based on, inter alia, self-determination of peoples, while para­
graph 4 identifies the United Nations as a center for harmonizing the actions 
of nations in the attainment of these ends. 
A threshold point is that the United Nations is a compact between sovereign 
States that agree to take collective action to attain international peace and 
security. There is no residual clause that places unallocated power in the hands 
of "the people" as does Amendment X of the U.S. Constitution. Agreement 
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between sovereign States is the legal glue of the UN Charter. That is all there 
is; and absent agreement, there is no legal basis for action. It follows that the 
rules regarding what States mayor may not do ultimately must be found within 
the text of the UN Charter that embodies their agreement. Subsequent practice 
that is consistent with the r ights and obligations expressed in the Charter may 
be accepted by States as part of the Charter legal regime. But if binding legal 
obligations are inferred from State practice, such acts of acceptance must be 
unmistakable. Implied legal obligations are not lightly imposed on sovereign 
States. Their agreement to be bound must be real, and this is usually clearer 
where expressed in writing, e.g., in treaties rather than inferred from State 
practice, e.g., customar y law. 
Article 2 reflects the fundamental premise that sovereign States are the 
building blocks of the UN Charter by providing that the Organization is "based 
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." The heart of the 
Charter is found in Article 2(4) that requires Members to refrain from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State. Paragraph 7 of Article 2 is especially germane for peacekeeping operations 
in that it prohibits the United Nations from inter vening in "matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jur isdiction of any state .... " The fact 
that the Secur ity Council declares a particular situation, as it did in the 1993 
peacekeeping inter vention in Haiti, to be a "threat to inter national peace and 
security" mayor may not satisfY all Charter legal requirements. This issue is of 
importance to future Security Council mandates regarding peacekeeping and 
will be discussed later in this study. At this stage, note that a Security Council 
mandate may meet the procedural, but not the substantive, requirements of the 
Charter. Article 2(7) finishes by providing that "this pr inciple shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." 
The distinction between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions is a 
critical part of this study. Traditional peacekeeping activities are based on consent. 
Enforcement measures, including enforcement actions, by contrast, are the opposite; 
that is, they are nonconsensual or coercive in nature. The Secretariat of the United 
Nations as an institution is not well-constituted, either legally or practically, to 
engage in the coercive use of military force. This is evidenced by the fact that the 
Secretary-General and his staff are international civil servants, not military profes­
sionals. It is recognized in Article 2(7) of the Charter that it may be necessary to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of a State to carry out enforcement measures 
authorized by the Security Council. Such intervention is an agreed upon role for 
sovereign States, acting collectively, to undertake as provided in the Charter. 
However, as we shall see, peacekeeping practice evolved to fill a gap left in the 
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Charter between peaceful resolution of disputes and collective enforcement 
measures. It was practice,  not Charter mandate, that revealed the need for UN 
forces to play a neutral, third-party military role. Indeed, this role for the 
Secretariat was not anticipated at all in the Charter. 
The principal problem with the way the Charter was written with respect 
to security and use of force issues was that the Permanent Members of the 
Security Council did not cooperate as fully as expected due to the Cold War. 
With the breakup of the Soviet bloc, the question now is whether the United 
Nations can function, more or less, as originally expected. The thesis developed 
in this study is that, while perfection is impossible, the letter and spirit of the 
UN Charter now can, and should, be followed more faithfully in peacekeeping 
activities. The Secretary-General ought to remain in charge of traditional 
peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the Secretary-General should not 
have "command and control" of operations to implement military enforcement 
measures. The Security Council should, instead, mandate enforcement action 
leadership either to an appropriate Chapter VIIJ regional collective security 
organization or to a Chapter VII coalition command constituted for the purpose 
by contributing Members. In mixed "war-peace" peacekeeping operations, 
whatever enforcement entity is mandated must, as a practical matter , cooperate 
closely with the Secretary-General, who is the leader of traditional peacekeeping 
efforts. But enforcement entities should report directly to the Security Council 
and future Security Council mandates should be crystal clear on this point. 
Equally, the Secretary-General and his staff should never be mandated to engage 
in enforcement. His proper and legal role is to "keep peace," not to "wage war." 
In Chapter II of the Charter, Members are defined as "states," and Article 5 
provides for the suspension of membership for States against whom preventive 
or enforcement action has been authorized by the Security Council. Chapter 
1II establishes, inter alia, the General Assembly, Security Council, and Secretariat 
as principal organs of the United Nations. This chapter also authorizes the 
establishment of necessary UN subsidiary organs. 
Chapter IV describes the functions and powers of the General Assembly. Any 
matter may be discussed in the General Assembly, including international peace 
and security. Except as provided in Article 12, it may make recommendations 
to Members or to the Security Council. But questions on what action is 
necessary must be referred to the Security Council. Article 12 provides that, 
while the Security Council is exercising its functions with regard to any dispute 
or situation, the General Assembly shall make no recommendation with regard 
to that dispute or situation unless requested by the Security Council. Otherwise, 
the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment 
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of any situation. This chapter also empowers the General Assembly to apportion 
the expenses to be borne by Members. 
Article 18 grants each Member of the General Assembly one vote . Decisions 
on "important" questions are to be made by a two-thirds majority. Such 
questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of inter­
national peace and security. 
Chapter V lays out the composition, powers, and functions of the Security 
Council. China, France, Russia , the United Kingdom, and the United States are 
the five Permanent Members. The General Assembly elects ten other members 
for two-year terms. Under Article 24, the Security Council is given the 
"primary" responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secur ity. 
Members specifically agree that the Security Council acts on their behalf in 
carrying out its duties. Moreover, Members expressly agree, in Article 25, to 
accept and carry out Security Council decisions. This latter undertaking is a 
binding legal duty by all Members to obey properly rendered decisions of the 
Security Council. 
Each Member of the Security Council has one vote. Decisions on procedural 
matters require an affir mative vote of nine Members. All other matters, i.e., 
substantive matters, require an affirmative vote of nine Members, including the 
concurring votes of the Permanent Members. In this regard, the long-standing 
practice of the United Nations is that an abstention by a Permanent Member 
does not constitute a veto. The Security Council may invite Members (or even 
non-Members) who are not on the Security Council to participate, without 
voting, in discussions of their disputes or where their interests are specially 
affected. 
Chapter VI is titled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." So-called Article 33 
disputes are those "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace 
and security." Parties to these disputes are first to resort to peaceful means of 
their own choice. The Security Council may investigate to determine whether 
the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and secur ity. Article 35 empowers any Member to bring 
any such dispute or situation to the attention of the Security Council or the 
General Assembly. Article 36 provides that the Secur ity Council may recom­
mend appropriate procedures or methods to the parties whereby peaceful 
settlement of Article 33 disputes may be achieved. The thrust of Chapter VI is 
for voluntary resolution of disputes by the parties. The parties are obligated, in 
the event that the hoped-for peaceful means are unsuccessful, to refer the dispute 
to the Security Council. The Security Council may recommend actual terms 
of settlement in such cases, especially when requested by the parties. 
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If the Security Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace, 
hreach of the peace, or act of aggression, it may take actions in accordance with 
Chapter VII to maintain or restore international peace and secur ity. To prevent 
aggravation of the situation, Article 40 empowers the Security Council to call 
upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it 
deems necessary or desirable. The Security Council may next decide, under 
Article 41, on measures by Members that do not involve the use of armed force. 
These may include interruption of economic relations and means of commu­
nication or the severance of diplomatic relations. If the Security Council fmds 
Article 41 measures inadequate, it may authorize an escalation, pursuant to 
Article 42, to such "action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 42 actions may 
include blockade and other military operations by Members' forces. Note here 
that the Charter mentions only "Members' forces" in connection with Chapter 
VII enforcement measures. There is no runt here or, for that matter, any where in 
the Charter of standby military forces to serve under the command of the 
Secretary-General. Instead, Article 43 imposes an affirmative obligation on 
Members to contribute armed forces, assistance, and facilities at the call of the 
Security Council. According to the Charter text, these contr ibutions were 
supposed to be made available in accordance with special agreements entered 
into for this purpose. The agreements were to cover the number and type of 
forces, readiness, and location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance. The 
agreements between the Secur ity Council and Members, or groups of Members, 
were to be subject to ratification by the signatory States in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes. As of this wr iting, no such agreements 
have been concluded as envisioned in the Charter. 
Article 45 contemplates Members holding "immediately available national 
air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action." Plans to use 
armed force under UN authorization were to be made with the assistance of the 
Military Staff Committee. Pursuant to Article 47, the Military Staff Committee is 
made up exclusively of representatives from the five Permanent Members. Its stated 
purpose in the Charter is "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions 
relating to the Security Council's military requirements .... " In that capacity, the 
Military Staff Committee is supposed to be responsible for the strategic direction 
of any armed forces acting under the Security Council. In fact, the Military Staff 
Committee has never functioned as intended. Permanent Five representatives to 
the Committee do meet regularly at UN Headquarters, but meetings are 
perfunctory and substantively meaningless. 
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Article 48 specifically requires all Members to carry out the actions decided 
by the Security Council under Chapter VII. These actions may be done directly 
or, going beyond the more general obligations contained in Article 25, through 
international agencies of which they are members. The obligatory nature of 
Article 48 with respect to enforcement actions makes this provision one of the 
most legally significant provisions in the Charter . For example, Member States 
are obligated to pursue policies in the World Bank that are consistent with 
Security Council decisions with respect to States against whom Security 
Council enforcement actions are underway. 
But the most important principle pertaining to the use of force in the UN 
Charter is found in Article 51, the last article in Chapter VII. The first sentence 
of Article 51 reads: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures neces­
sary to maintain international peace and security. 
Members are still obliged to inform the Security Council immediately of 
the measures they exercise in their self-defense. And, the use of Article 51 
self-defense measures do es not relieve the Security Council of its obligations 
to take necessary actions to maintain or restore international peace and secur ity. 
Experts debate whether Article 51 creates an independent right of self-defense 
or simply recognizes that such a right exists under customary law. Perhaps it 
does both, although each legal theory carries different legal nuances. The text 
in the Charter imposes a condition precedent of an "armed attack" (at least in 
the English translation) and a condition subsequent of "until" the Security 
Council acts, presumably in an effective manner. These specific limitations do not 
exist in pre-Charter customary international law. In fact, the view that custom­
ary law rights (and duties) of self-defense coexist with Article 51 gives expanded 
scope to use of force by States. W hile the temptation is great to delve more into 
the debate about what is the true meaning of self-defense, this urge must be 
resisted due to the scope of this study. The reader is referred, instead, to other 
sources that are fo cused solely on the topic of self-defense and Article 51.1 
Birth of Peacekeeping 
The ChapterVII enforcement measures provided in Articles 41 and 42 are 
the backbone of the Charter's collective security system. The underlying premise 
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in this system is that the five Permanent Members in the Security Council can 
agree sufficiently on the use of armed force that none consistently vetoes 
required actions. A correlative premise is that the Security Council may not 
mandate enforcement actions affirmatively opposed by any one of the Perma­
nent Five. Frequently, on peacekeeping votes, a Permanent Member expresses 
neutrality in the form of an abstention. As noted above, the time-honored 
practice of the Security Council is that an abstention is not a veto. Nevertheless, 
consistent lack of enthusiasm, as has been the case with China, should not be 
dismissed as an insignificant political attitude. Any Member of the Permanent 
Five is capable of cr ippling the Security Council's effectiveness. That is the 
safeguard that Member States wanted, and therefore so provided in the Charter, 
prior to the United Nation's taking affirmative action on international peace 
and security matters. This hard-core political reality provides the central legal 
and institutional framework within which peacekeeping mandates must be 
formulated. At the same time, while the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Five 
also make up the Military Staff Committee that was to plan Security Council 
military activities under the Charter, there is no indication that peacekeeping 
planning will be entrusted to that committee. And, of course, there is no legal 
obligation on the part of the Security Council to use the Military Staff 
Committee as originally planned. 
The cooperation of the Permanent Five after World War II, which permitted 
the founding of the United Nations, dissipated shortly after the Charter entered 
into force. The Cold War ensued with the Soviet Union and its Easter n Bloc 
allies on one side and with the United States, France, and Great Br itain and 
their allies on the other. The Republic of China government soon no longer 
exercised sovereignty over the ter ritory of mainland China, and China's seat on 
the Security Council was eventually taken in the mid-1970s by a communist 
regime. This further handicapped cooperation among the Permanent Five and 
effective functioning of their Military Staff. The result was to cripple the 
collective security arrangements envisioned in the Charter. 
At the same time, new conflicts arose that commanded the attention of the 
United Nations. In particular, the process of decolonization unleashed ethnic 
strife and destabilized various regions. W here armed crises developed, Members 
of the United Nations felt pressured into finding ways to contain hostilities and 
to control conflicts outside the legal parameters expressly provided within the 
four corners of the Charter text. 
As peacekeeping operations were not anticipated by the Charter draftsmen, 
no descr iption of the practices is given in Charter text. At first, the Security 
Council formulated mandates tailored to the particular circumstances of each 
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crisis, and peacekeeping practice "just grew," case by case, over a period of 
time. The characteristics of a peacekeeping doctrine therefore emerged 
gradually as the United Nations responded to various conflict situations in 
which the international community expected it to act in the interests of 
world peace. Most frequently, a peacekeeping activity was a UN operation 
using military personnel, not in a fighting or enforcement role but rather in 
an observer or "buffer" role. The peacekeeping forces der ived their legiti­
macy from the fact that the contending State parties wanted them in their 
sovereign territory and expressly agreed to their presence. They di d not 
expect to fight in the first instance. 
Since the peacekeeper s were in the host State with the consent of the 
contending parties, including the host government recognized by the United 
Nations, the host Member nation was expected to cooperate with the 
peacekeeping efforts. The peacekeeper s were, accordingly, lightly armed and, in 
principle, were to engage only in their individual or unit self-defense. Use of 
force was clearly a last resort. Most importantly, these UN "blue helmets" were 
neutrals with orders to act impartially. The core idea was that the traditional 
peacekeepers were invited guests of the recognized government and were 
expected to achieve peacekeeping objectives more by moral authority than by 
force of arms. It was understood by all that UN forces would act in self-defense, 
in the personal protection sense, when resort to the use of armed force was 
truly unavoidable. But the real role of the traditional peacekeeper was keeping 
peace between consenting nations, not taking enforcement actions against 
unwilling parties. 
The term "peacekeeping" initially may have come into general use around 
1956 when the United Nations created a "Special Committee on Peace-keeping 
Operations." Typically, these peacekeeping operations involved supervision and 
maintenance of cease-fires, assistance in troop withdrawals, and provision of 
buffer zones between opposing forces. The legal mandate was always to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. The operations were also conducted 
in a political climate where the primary responsibility for success or failure lay 
with civilian personnel. 
A point to note at this stage is that the traditional peacekeeping doctrine that 
evolved through ad hoc practice was less peaceful than was envisioned in Chapter 
VI and less forceful than the doctrine that was contemplated in Chapter VII of 
the Charter. This led to the oft-cited observation of the late Secretary-General 
Dag Hammarskjold that these kinds of traditional peacekeeping activities were 
authorized under a nonexistent Chapter "six and one-half" of the UN Charter. 
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North Atlantic Treaty 
The important role to be played by regional organizations in the maintenance 
of international peace and security is primarily recognized in Chapter VIII of 
the Charter. Article 52 provides that regional arrangements may deal with peace 
and security issues "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations." Indeed, paragraph 2 of Article 52 requires Members in such agencies 
to "make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement oflocal disputes through 
such regional arrangements ... before referring them to the Security Council." 
In turn, the Security Council is to encourage pacific settlement of local disputes 
through such regional arrangements. In essence, the secur ity sy stem in the 
Charter is predicated upon action by a regional organization prior to the stage 
when the United Nations, as a global entity, must become involved. 
Article 53 provides that the Security Council may utilize regional arrange­
ments for enforcement action taken under its authority. At the same time, this 
Chapter VIII article is quite specific in prohibiting enforcement acti on by 
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. A collateral 
note here is that there is no Charter prohibition to preclude Nato as a legal 
entity from being itself a party to a Charter VIII collective security arrangement. 
Indeed, this possibility could be a key for a new collective security alliance in 
Europe. Lastly, Article 54 requires that the Security Council be kept fully 
informed about the international peace and security activities of regional 
agencIes. 
The North Atlantic Treaty that charters Nato entered into force on 24 August 
1949. The parties to this agreement are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The North Atlantic Treaty text begins with a: reaffirmation of the UN Charter. 
The Parties express a resolve to "unite their efforts for collective defense and 
for the preservation of peace and security." In Art icle 1, the Parties pledge 
themselves to the peaceful settl ement of disputes and to refrain "from the threat 
or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations." Article 2 dea ls with economic collaborati on and stability. Article 3 
provides that the Parties "will maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack." By Article 4, the Parties agree to 
consult when the "territor ial integrity, political independence or security of 
any of the Parties is threatened." Article 5, the heart of the commitment in the 
Nato alliance, reads in its entirety as follows: 
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The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof are to be 
immediately reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary 
to restore and maintain international peace and security. 
Article 6 defines an Article 5 armed attack to include an armed attack on 
the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America or on the vessels 
or aircraft in this area . 
Article 7 provides that the Treaty does not affect the Members' rights and 
obligations under the UN Charter or the primary responsibility of the Security 
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 9 
establishes the Nato Council, and the remainder of the articles are largely 
procedural. 
T he collective response contemplated in the North Atlantic Treaty is predi­
cated on an armed attack against a Party's territory in Europe or North America. 
But, as noted at the beginning of this heading, enforcement through the regional 
arrangement scheme provided in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is subordinate 
to the Security Council where any Permanent Five Member can veto action. 
Clearly, however, the Western Powers that formed Nato did not want to be 
under the control of an organ in which the Soviet Union held a decisive veto. 
The purpose of Nato was to defend against the Soviet bloc, and the North 
Atlantic Treaty understandably makes no mention of any relationship to the 
Security Council as a "regional arrangement" under Chapter VIII. Nato is set 
up to use armed force without Security Council authorization, and there is no 
requirement that the alliance take military enforcement action only after 
receiving authorization from the Security Council. Instead, the North Atlantic 
Treaty is expressly founded on the "collective self-defense" theory in Article 
51 of the UN Charter. Consistent with that, the Treaty simply requires 
immediate reporting to the Security Council of" all measures taken" in response 
to an armed attack. 
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No defmition of "regional ar rangement" is given in the UN Charter, and 
experts have not always agreed on Nato's status in this regard. Nothing in the 
UN Charter itself precludes Nato from assisting the Security Council in 
enforcement actions. At the same time, such a role for Nato was not envisioned 
in the North Atlantic Treaty. 
As a matter of international law, a fundamental difference exists bet ween a 
regional organization founded on the pr in ciple of self-defense in Article 
51 and one founded on the collective security principles in Article 53. The latter 
entity is expressly prohibited from taking enforcement actions "without the 
authorization of the Security CounciL ... "From a US. domestic law standpoint, 
the difference is also legally significant. The US. Senate did not give its "advice 
and consent," as required by the US. Constitution, to a North Atlantic Treaty 
whereby N ato was to perform collective security duties under Security Council 
direction. Nato was to defend against armed attacks against the Parties' territory, 
aircraft, or vessels in North America or Europe. This agreement was approved 
by the US. Senate as an Article 51 self-defense organization under Chapter VII, 
not as an Article 53 collective security organization under Chapter VI II. 
UN Secretariat and Military Staff Committee 
Article 97 creates the UN Secretariat consisting of the Secretary-General and 
such staff as the Organization may require. The Security Council recommends 
a candidate for Secretary-General who is then appointed by the General 
Assembly. The Secretary-General is expressly denoted in Article 97 as the chief 
administrative officer of the United Nations. Among other powers, the Secre­
tary-General may bring matters which threaten peace and secur ity to the 
attention of the Security Council. Other articles emphasize that the first loyalty 
of Secretariat employees is to the United Nations and layout other details. 
As the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations, the Secretary­
General has considerable latitude in determining the size of the staff needed to 
fulfill the functions of the Secretariat. One possible reading of the lack of 
limitations in Article 97 is that the Security Council, or even the General 
Assembly, could authorize per manent UN Forces, a "standing army," to serve 
under the command of the Secretary-General . An argument can be made, for 
example, that he already recruits security forces to guard UN Headquarters. The 
forces could be expanded to help "police the world." However, the power to 
create and control the staff required by the Organization for its internal security 
is far different from the power to command troops for enforcement actions in 
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the name of the United Nations. This idea of a UN Guard was carefully 
considered and the concept rejected.
2 
An objective reading of the Charter reveals virtually no support for the notion 
that a leading role for the Secretary-General was planned regarding the use of 
force. In truth, in Article 47, a large role for the Military Staff Committee was 
contemplated in advising the Security Council on the use of UN armed forces. 
The Committee was to consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Members 
of the Security Council or their representatives. As such, the Military Staff 
Committee was expected to be competent to give "strategic direction" to the 
armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. In addition, to 
obtain such forces, the Security Council was to conclude agreements to make 
forces available upon its call. 
An early effort was undertaken to have the Military Staff Committee provide 
the strategic direction and other services outlined above, as provided in the 
Charter. But once again, the lack of political consensus among the Permanent 
Five Members caused these efforts to be abandoned in August 1948.
3
The most 
insurmountable problem was an inability to agree on the total size of the forces 
and on the relative sizes of the contributions of the Permanent Five. A second 
basic disagreement arose over the location of the forces pending their use by 
the Security Council. The third disagreement concerned provision of assistance 
and facilities, including rights of passage, for armed forces. Essentially, this 
question revolved around the extent to which a Member would commit in 
advance for the use of its ter ritory by the armed forces operating under the 
Security Council. The fourth major disagreement was over the obligation in 
Article 29 to provide full logistical support for the forces contributed. At their 
core, all the disagreements arose from political distrust related to the East-West 
rivalry. 
The lack of support to make use of the Military Staff Committee, as provided 
in the Charter, does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Secretary­
General must, or even should, step in to play that role. Granted, the Security 
Council needs more professional advice on military matters than it has at the 
present. The creation of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and the 
subsequent establishment of the Peace-keeping Situation Centre in April 1993 
were constructive steps in this regard. The Centre will improve the monitoring 
and information exchange between UN Headquarters and peacekeeping 
missions in the field. This should enhance the effectiveness of the United 
Nations in traditional peacekeeping operations. But there are definite limits to 
what to expect from UN officials as military planners in the enforcement arena. 
For example, no major power is yet ready to entrust sensitive intelligence 
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information either to UN civil servants or to the Military Staff Committee 
composed of all Members of the Permanent Five. And, as establishment of the 
Situation Centre illustrates, real-time information is indispensable to effective 
military planning and operations. The point is that military planners assigned 
to UN Headquarters, who must gear up for intense enforcement actions, face 
not only formidable legal and institutional barriers but also inherent operational 
constraints. 
Uniting for Peace Resolution 
On 25 June 1950, the United States informed the Secretary-General that 
North Korean forces had invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea and 
requested an immediate convening of the Security Council to consider the 
situation. By coincidence, the Soviet Union was boycotting Security Council 
meetings to protest the presence of the Republic of China in the permanent 
seat designated for the representative of China. Nevertheless, the Council met 
and the Secretary-General characterized the Korean situation as a "threat to 
international peace.,,
4 
On 27 June, the Council adopted a resolution with a 
determination that the North Korean armed attack constituted a breach of the 
peace. The Council recommended that Members furnish assistance, under 
Article 43, to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and 
security. Subsequently, sixteen Members provided military assistance and, pur­
suant to another resolution adopted on 7 July 1950, authorized a unified 
command structure under United States leadership. 
The Soviet representative ended his boycott of the Security Council in 
August. By resuming his seat on the Council and regaining his nation's veto 
power, further authorization for enforcement action by the Security Council 
on the Korean issue was stopped. The General Assembly, faced with an obvious 
threat to international peace and security caused by a classic unwarranted act 
of aggression, stepped in to pass, on 3 November 1950, the "Resolution on 
Uniting for Peace . .. 5 The General Assembly noted the failure of the Security 
Council to discharge its duties, citing overuse of the veto and the non-imple­
mentation of its Article 43 calJ to arms. Section A of the Resolution provided 
"that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent 
Members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly 
shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of 
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a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, 
to maintain or restore inter national peace and security." 
The implicit legal rationale for the Uniting for Peace Resolution was that 
the General Assembly may do by recommendation under Chapter IV what the 
Security Council may do by decision under Chapter VII. This is a fundamentally 
flawed legal rationale. It is true that the Security Council is given "primary" 
and not "exclusive" responsibility in matters affecting international peace and 
security. It is equally true that the General Assembly has a proper advisory role 
on such matters as outlined in the Charter. But nowhere is it contemplated in 
the Charter that the General Assembly may authorize enforcement actions on 
behalf of the United Nations. As its very name implies, that role was entrusted 
to the Security Council under the express language of the Charter. The General 
Assembly may offer opinions on such matters, and may even urge Members 
with recommendations; the Charter does not, however, constitute it as an action 
body for dealing with international peace and security. Moreover, considering 
that the Security Council did initially authorize a collective response to North 
Korea's aggression, the Korean War case provides a weak precedent for claiming 
expansive enforcement action powers being exercised by the General Assembly. 
A large role for the General Assembly in traditional peacekeeping is, of course, 
an entirely different matter. W hen done properly, they are undertaken with the 
consent of the sovereign States impacted. Suffice to note here that, hopefully, 
the General Assembly will never again have to ftIl a void caused by the 
unwillingness of the Security Council to meet its enforcement action respon­
sibilities under the Char ter. 
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Peacekee ping Practice 
A
s NOTED AT THE OUTSET of this study, the term "peacekeeping" does 
not  appear in the UN Charter, and there is no universal agreement about 
the precise content of its doctrine. However, over time, certain characterist ics 
of UN peacekeeping operations emerged in practice. The most notable aspect 
is that traditional peaceke eping operations were conducted with the agreement 
or consent of the parties to the conflict . This was true whether the peacekeepers 
were deployed under the direct command and control of the UN Secretary­
General or under Member States operating with delegated authority from the 
Security Council. Military operations undertaken by UN-authorized forces in 
either case migh t have been ,  for example, to monitor and facilitate implemen­
tation of  an existing truce agreement in  support of  diplomatic efforts to  reach 
a political settlement . In such an instance, the consent of the disputants is 
important not only for the safety of the peacekeepers but also as positive 
evidence that the contending parties are sincere about concluding a last ing 
peace.  The contending parties typically must agree upon many details of the 
deployment , including the nationality of the troops in the peacekeeping military 
forces. 
Another key characteristic, in addition to host State agreement or warrin g  
factions' consent ,  is that the tradit ional peacekeeper was to maintain strict 
impartiality. A fundamental Charter principle, clearly expressed in Article 2(7) ,  
is the rule of nonintervention in the domestic affairs o f  any S t at e .  Absent 
consent  by t h e  legit imate gove r n me nt , UN traditional peacekeeping opera­
tions are no t  legally empowered to interfere in the internal affairs of Member 
States. The traditional peacekeepers' mandate is suspect if the missio n cannot 
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be executed on the basis of the go od faith consent and reliable cooperation of 
the contenders in the conflict. To stay within the terms of the Charter, traditional 
UN peacekeepers are not to use armed force against one domestic faction in 
favor of another. The neutrality of the UN forces is lost when they take sides. 
An additional consequence of taking sides is the loss of moral authority, an 
asp ect critic al to the maintenance of the lon g-term credibility and effectiveness 
of UN fo rces. 
A third important element is that a traditional peacekeeper is not to resort to 
the use oj force except in strictly construed instances of individual or unit 
self-defense. Armed conflict is to be avoided in th e deployment strategy and in 
the mind-set of the UN peacekeep ers. The tro ops are not en couraged to engage 
in armed conflict, be cause they thereby become swept up in the conflict. Use 
of force by UN peac ekeepers only adds fuel to the fIre they are trying to help 
extinguish. But when peacekeepers do use force affirmatively, they must expect 
to be judged by the customary laws of armed conflict . Military troops who 
voluntarily engage in combat cannot have it both ways. UN traditional 
peacekeepers deserve spe cial immunity and treatment as neutrals or "experts 
on mission" only when they protect themselves or noncombatants entrusted to 
their pro tection .
6 
But if they resort to the non-self-defense use of force, i . e . , 
engage in enforcement actions, they must r ightly expect to be treated as 
combatants by their adversaries, against whom they may be employin g deadly 
force . Combatant activities are inextricably linked to combatant legal status for  
the individual military participant , includin g treatment as  a prisoner of war if 
cap tured. To avoid this, i. e . ,  to be entitled to be treated as, e.g. , "exp erts on 
mission" as distinguished from " combatants," enforcement action mandates 
sho uld not be given to traditional peacekeeping op erations. Likewise , 
peacekeeping labels should not be attached to enforcement action op erations. 
Enforcement actio ns should carry enforcement legal consequences, even if 
labeled " pe ace enforcement" or "peace implementation,"  to bro aden public 
app eal . 
Through out history, responsible natio ns have made commendable efforts to 
gain universal accep tanc e of conventional and customary rules for armed 
co nflict that foster clarity between friend and fo e. I ndividual soldiers, who se 
lives are on the line, cannot be left in doubt about either their own status or 
the status of their enemy. Political leaders, whether at the United Nations or in 
Member States ,  should avoid policies or decisions that leave deliberate doubt 
in an armed conflict on the critical question of whether individual troops are 
noncombatants, combatants , or neutrals. 
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Part of this study is directed toward reducing confusio n  over mandates in 
UN or Nato-led peacekeeping operations. Perfect clarity in military operations 
is a goal that is seldom achieved, even in the classic warfare sett ings such as were 
the norm in World War II . However, it is painfully evident that vague rules of 
engagement are being applied in mixed "war-peace" settin gs, all groupe d  under 
the broad-brush rubric of peacekeeping. The lines between traditional 
peacekeeping and genuine enforcement actions are being blurred, both con­
sciously and unconsciously. Whatever the reasons for this development , a 
pressing need exists for a clearer consensus among UN Members on a military 
doctr ine for peacekeep ing operatio ns and on the Security Council's confer ring 
mandates consisten t with such doctr ine.  The place to start is in reforming 
Security Council peacekeeping mandates by drawing bright lines between 
traditional peacekeeping operations and enforc ement actions. This app roach is, 
in fact, what was envisioned in the UN Charter. O nce that pr inciple is 
understood and accepted, it can be demonstrated how "mixed" operations ought 
to be conducted. A modest effort to illustrate this idea is given in several scenarios 
in Chapter IV of this study. 
Fifty years after the founding of the United Nations ,  th e  fundamental legal 
and institutional arrangements in the Charter for dealing with international 
peac e and secur ity issues are still workable. The political premise is still valid 
that the United Nations ought not to venture into the realm of armed conflict 
in the fac e  of affirmative opposition from any of the five powerful nations that 
sit permanently on the Security Council . Despite the economic strength of 
nations such as Ger many and Japan , the rationale in the Charter for entrusting 
the Se curity Council, as presently co nstituted, with UN multilateral use-of-force 
decisions, remains basically valid. In th e ser ious realm of UN use of force, it is 
prudent to try to make better that which is known to work than to exp eriment 
with unknowns. This is not to suggest that wealthy States cannot play a leading 
role in p eacekeeping. Military ventures are expensive operations, as the United 
Nations has come to recognize. If wealthy natio ns want to pay disproportio n­
ately for peacekeeping o perations, creative means should be  found to permit 
them to have political clout on peacekeeping issues that are commensurate with 
their additional financial contr ibutions. Absent such an unantiCipated infusion 
of funds, the United Nations cannot afford to main tain peaceke eping activit ies 
at the level it has in the past . It  cannot afford to do so not only because its legal 
basis to do so is questionable, but also because it will exhaust its funds for other 
purposes if it does. 
Ambitious p eacekeeping experienc e  since th e end of the Cold War has 
provided UN Members with poignant lessons about the high cost of military 
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operations. The Security Council has the clear le gal duty under the Charter to 
monitor peace-threatening situations and to authorize collective intervention 
by armed fo rce as a last reso rt. But , absent disproportionate financial commit­
ments such as the United State s made to the Secur ity Council for Haiti, 
Members volunteer military personnel for peacekeeping operations and the 
General Assembly authorizes payment for them. This latter action is based on 
the assumption that the United Nations can raise the money to pay for very 
expensive UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping decisions by the General 
Assembly must take into account its finite resources and the fact that the United 
Nations do es some things better than other things. Money devoted to expensive 
military ventures that it doe s  not do particularly well may take away resource s  
from activities that i t  does do well. Moreover, unlike military operations, the 
diminished activitie s may well be ones that the United Nations itself was set up 
to do. When the United Nations takes on tasks that it is le gally and institutionally 
ill-equipped to do, it is also more likely to suffer failures. Failures do not promote 
lasting peace and hurt the overall credibility of the United Nations.  Thus , there 
are major drawbacks to consider when th e United Nations faces what may 
superficially appear to be laudable tasks in the pursuit of peacekeeping, unless 
there is genuine political will and dedicated financial means to achieve the 
mandate. Nations will not continue to sen d their citizens in harm's way unless 
the contributing governments know what to exp ect, both operationally an d 
financially. In recent years, the Security Council has not always gotten it right.  
Sometimes the mandate provides too much guidance and sometimes too little 
with respect to UN sanctions or the use of force.  
Improvement in Security Council mandates and in General Assembly 
finances is essential for the United Nations to remain effective in both traditional 
peacekeeping and enfo rcement action operations. To o much responsibility for 
military planning has recently b een so ught by, delegated to, and accepted by the 
Secretary-General with re spect to peacekeeping mandates. In sorting out proper 
mandates, it cannot be overemphasized that the Secur ity Council alone retains 
not only the primary but also the residual power and duty to deal with 
international peace and security issues under the UN Charter. The enforcement 
job was never intended for the Secretary-General and his staff of professional 
international civil servants. Traditional peacekeeping, based on the consent of 
the warring factions, is in principle entirely different . The main idea is that the 
Secur ity Council cannot claim authority without taking responsibility an d 
accountability for global peace an d security. The Charter has it about right ; and 
UN quasi-successes and failures in the realm of peacekeeping have come largely 
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from not fo llowing the Charter's fundamental distinctions with resp ect to 
defensive and offensive use of force, as intended and as written . 
The mandates fo r the forty "peacekeeping" operations author ized by the 
Security Council since the founding of the United Nations through the end 
of 1 99 5  are highlighted in the following review. This survey provide s a factual 
context for assessing how to reform peacekeeping mandates, particularly by 
emphasizing the distin ction between traditio nal peaceke eping and enforcement 
actions. Peacekeeping operatio ns still underway at the end of 1 9 9 5  are identified 
with an aster isk. 
1 .  * UNTS O .  The UN Truce Supervision Organization was the first 
peacekeeping mission. It was authorized in May 1 948 by Se curity Council 
Resolution (SCR) 5 0 .  The Security Council called for a halt to the first 
Arab-Israeli war and placed military observers in the region near Palestine 
to monitor cease-fires, to  supervise armistice agreements, to deter inci­
dents, and to assist in late r peacekeepin g operations, esp ecially by providin g 
Military Observers to UNIFIL and UNDOF. UNTS O had 1 94 Military 
Observers in 1 9 95 ,  who cost the United Nations an estimated annual 
amount of $28 . 6  millio n.  UN TSO has incurred 38 fatalities over 47 years 
of operation. 
2 .  * UNMO GIP.  The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
was autho rized by the Se curity Council in SCR 47 and e st ablished in 
January 1 9 49 .  The mandate for UNMOGIP, provided in SCR 9 1 , is to  
monito r the 1 94 9  Karachi Agreement ce ase-fire between India and 
Pakistan and to discourage further fighting over the disputed state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. UNMO GIP's operations cost an est imated annual 
$7 . 2  million to the United Nations during 1 9 9 5 .  This pays for about 44 
Military Observers who have sustained 9 fatalities over 47 years. 
3. UNEF I.  The first UN Emergency Force served between November 
1 956 and June 1 9 67, after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal . France, the 
United Kingdom, and I srael had intervened with armed fo rces .  The 
involvement of two of the Permanent Five nations with veto powers 
prevented the Security Council from responding to what was an obviou s 
threat to international peace and security. An emergency General Assembly 
session resulted in Gene ral Assembly Resolution 1 0 0 0  (adopted without 
a negative vote  cast) mo re or less authorizing the first arme d UN 
peacekeeping force . UNEF I troops supervised the with drawal of the 
outside fo rces and acted as a buffer between the disputants.  UNEF I left 
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after Egypt withdrew consent for it to be on Egyptian territo ry. One 
month later, the June 1 967 "six-day war" erupted. 
4. uNOGIL. Th e peacekeeping mandate for th e UN Observation Group 
in Leb anon arose out ofS CR 1 28 and lasted fromJun e  1 9 58 to December 
1 9 58. Lebanon had charged Syr ia with interference in its internal affairs. 
UNOGIL observers ensured that personn el, arms, an d materials were not 
inftltrated across Lebanese borders. The mission was terminated, and 
UNOGIL withdrew when tensions eased. 
5.  ONUC. The Operation des Nations Unies au Congo was a large-scale 
operation in the Congo that technically lasted from July 1 9 60 to June 
1 9 64 . SCR 1 4 3  auth orized the Se cretary-General to take the "ne cessary 
steps" for military assistance and related activities to assist a newly 
independent government restore order. ONUC went well beyond tradi ­
tional peacekeeping. Congolese troops had mutinied and Belgian forces 
had intervened. The Security Council authorized the establishment of a 
UN operation that eventually required some 1 9 ,000 armed troops. For a 
while, the United Nations even assumed responsibility for the territorial 
integrity and political indepen dence of the Congo. After four years, the 
Congolese government did not ask to extend ONUC, and the Secretary­
General ordered its withdrawal . 
6. UNTEA/ UNSF. Th e UN S ecur ity Force in West Irian serve d  as a 
Temporary Executive Authority and se curity force.  The Gen eral Assembly 
(with no negative votes cast) authorized the Secretary-General in General 
Assembly Re solution 1 752 to carry out certain agre ed upon tasks with 
respect to the hostilities between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West 
Irian.  A cease -fire arrangement gave the United Nations administrative 
responsibility for the terr ito ry pending its transfer to In donesia. This 
mission, largely devoted to uph olding the author ity of UNTEA, lasted 
from O ctober 1 962 to Apr il 1 9 63. 
7 . UNYOM. The Yemen Observation Mission arose out of a report by 
Secretary-General U Thant an d a subsequent SCR 1 79 ,  duringJune 1 963 , 
that the support by Egypt and S audi Arabia for competing factions in 
Yemen 's civil war threatened a wider conflict that endangered interna­
tional peace and security. The Secretary's peace initiative led to an 
agreement on disengagement , and the Security Council established UN­
YOM , which oversaw implementation of the agreement from July 1 9 63 
to September 1 9 64 . 
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8. * UNFICYP. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus was establish ed 
in March 1 964 by SCR 1 86 ,  with a mandate to serve on Cyprus to help 
prevent violence between Greek- Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot commu­
nities. The mandat e has been renewed at six-month intervals ever since. 
Since 1 974 , UNFICYP has also been deployed along a buffer zone between 
the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Turkish military forces. The civilian 
po lice numbered 35 in 1 995,  while the troop strength was 1 , 1 66. UNFI­
CYP sustained 1 67 fatalities over 32 years of op eration. 
9 .  D OMREP. The Dominican Republic Representative peacekeeping 
mission invo lve d the dispatch , p ursuan t to SCR 203 , of a Spec ial 
Repre sentative of the Secretary-Gen eral to the D ominican Republic 
in May 1 965 . The Organizat ion of the American S t ates  sent  a p eace 
forc e and the United N ations sent military observers to monitor a 
cease -fire between r ival government fo rces .  T his was the first time a 
UN p eaceke eping mission dealt with the same matters at the same time 
as a re gional o rganization.  After a n ew government was installe d,  the 
Dominican R epublic requested the withdrawal of the UN Mission , 
which was acco mplished by 22 O ctober 1 9 66.  
10 .  UNIPOM. The UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission also involved 
India and Pakistan's co ntinuing dispute over the territory of Kashmir. The 
Secur ity Council established the UNIPOM , pursuant to S CR 21 1 ,  during 
September 1 965 to consolidate a cease-fire along t h e in t e r n at i o n al 
bo rder and t o  sup e rv i s e  t h e  with drawal o f  t h e  co ntending States'  
respective forces.  UNIPOM worked closely with the already existent 
UNMOGI P .  UNIPOM was disbanded, and UNMO GIP reverted to its 
original monitoring role after UNIPOM's mission was accomplished in 
March 1 966.  
1 1 .  UNEF I I .  The Second UN Emergency Force was creat e d  by the 
Security Council in SCR 340 during October 1 973 . Egypt and I srael were 
at war in the Suez Canal and Sinai regions. With the consent of the 
belligerents, UNE F II was interposed in the Suez Canal sector between 
the opp o sing forces. After the belligerents agreed to withdraw, UNEF II 
was disbanded in July 1 979. 
1 2. *  UND O F .  The UN D isengagement Observer Force began operations 
inJune 1 974, pursuant to SCR 350.  In May 1 9 74 , an uneasy truce between 
I srael and Syr ia was brokered by the United States for the Go lan Heights . 
The Secur ity Council mandate established UND OF to maintain a cease-
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fire to sup ervise the agreement on areas of separation and to ensure that 
other limitations were observed by both sides. The estimated annual cost 
to the United Nations for UNDOF is $32.2 million at the 1 99 5  force level 
of approximately 1 ,200 personnel. UNDOF sustained 36 casualties over a 
21 -year span. UNDOF's mandate continued throughout 1 996. 
1 3 .  * UNIFIL. Th e UN Inter im Forc e in Le banon was establishe d by 
the S ecur ity Coun cil in S CR 425 during March 1 9 78. Israel ret aliated 
agai nst a PLO c ommando raid by attac kin g PLO bases in southern 
Lebanon .  UNIFI L's mandate was to confirm I sraeli wi thdrawal from 
Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese government in rest or ing its effective 
control in the are a. The Interim Force was un able to deploy fully, as 
instructe d ,  b e cause I srael insisted on maintaining a "secur ity zo n e "  
north of th e Lebanese border and h anded over part of  the are a t o  
Le bane se de facto forc es .  T h e  Interim Forc e remain e d  to dampen 
vio lence ,  to  promo te stability, and to  provide h umanitar ian assis tan c e  
t o  the local populace. Th e  estimated annual c ost to t h e  Un ited Natio n s  
for UNIFIL i n  1 9 95 was $1 42 . 3  million . This sum supports approxi­
mately 4 ,700 tro ops who have sustained 207 fatalities over 1 7  years .  
T h e  mandate fo r UNIFlL was stre amlined in 1 9 9 5  an d t h e  op eration 
was continued throughout 1 9 9 6 .  
14 .  UNGOMAP . This pe acekeepin g ac tivity involve d t h e  provision of 
a UN Good O ffic e s  Missio n  in Afgh anistan an d Pakistan .  The invasion 
o f  Afghanistan by th e Sovi et  Union in late 1 9 79 predictably resulted 
in a de adlo cke d debat e in the S e cur ity Council .  The matter was 
referred,  un der the " Uniting for Peac e "  pro cedure , to an emergency 
session of t h e  General Assembly, which strongly c ondemned the Sovie t 
armed int ervention . In early 1 98 1 ,  the S e cre tary-General sent his 
personal represen tative to the region to help n e go tiate a re solut ion of 
the conflict .  On 8 April 1 9 8 8 ,  Gen eva Accord s were finalized be tween 
the Soviet  Union,  Afghanistan ,  Paki stan, and the United Stat es, provid­
ing for the S ovie t  withdrawal and for noninterference by Afghanistan 
and Pakistan . The Security Council, in SCR 622 , confirmed the 
arrangements in the Gen eva Accords.  UN monitors were dispatch e d ,  
Soviet forces left ,  and UNG OMAP 's mandate was terminate d 1 5  March 
1 9 9 0 .  
1 5 .  UNIIMOG. The U N  Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group's mandate 
was set out in S CR 5 9 8 ,  dur ing July 1 9 87, when the Security Council 
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authorized dire ct talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General . Iran 
and Iraq finally agreed in mid-1 988,  after eight years of bloo dy fighting, 
to a cease -fire and the placement of UN observers in a classic buffer role. 
UNIIMOG it self thus actually functioned from August 1 9 88 to February 
1 9 9 1 . UNIIM OG forces were disbanded after confirming the withdrawal 
from the territories respectively occupied by the forces of both Iran and 
Iraq. 
1 6 . UNAVEM 1. The UN Angola Verification Mission was established by 
SCR 626 in December 1 9 88,  pursuant to a request from the governments 
of Angola and Cuba. A 1 978 Security Council resolution, SCR 435 ,  dealt 
with the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola. Intensive mediation by the United States led to agreement 
between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa for a phased withdrawal of Cuban 
troops from Angola. The role of the UN peacekeepers was to ver ify their 
withdrawal, as agreed. UNAVEM I deployed from January 1 9 89 to the 
successful fulftllment of it s mandate in June 1 9 9 1 . 
1 7 . UNTAG. The UN Transition Assistance Group's peacekeeping mis­
s ion i n  N am i b i a  l a s t e d fro m  Apr il 1 9 8 9  t o M arch 1 9 9 0 .  T h e  
Se curity Council adopted SCR 435 during September 1 9 78 , which 
contained a detailed plan for Namibia's transition to independence 
through free and fair elections. South Africa resisted this effort for ten 
years, but the UNTAG operation, with many unique elements, was finally 
launched in 1 9 89.  The S ecurity Council gave the Secretary-General a 
far-reaching mandate which involved the United N ations deeply in the 
political process of Namibia's transition from an occupied territ ory to a 
sovereign and independent State. Eventually, some 8 ,000 military and 
civilian personnel from 1 20 nations participated in UN TAG . The UN's 
efforts resulted in Namibia's joining the United N atio ns in April 1 9 90 ,  
after holding successful democratic elections. 
1 8 . ONUCA. The UN Observer Group in Central America peacekeeping 
operation , approved by SCR 644 , ran from November 1 9 89 to January 
1 9 92. The Observer Group was part of extensive UN involvemen t in 
assisting five Central American governments to keep their se curity com­
mitments.  The Security Council established ONUCA to assist in ver ifying 
that the governments in the region were no longer providing arms and 
other aid to irregular forces . ONUCA forces later supported the voluntary 
demobilization of over 20,000 members of the Nicaraguan Resistance. 
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1 9 . *  UNIKOM. The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission was author­
ized in SCR 689 , following the suspension of hostilities after the U. S. and 
Saudi Arabian-le d multin ational coalition had restored peace and security 
in the region by expelling Iraq from Kuwait. UNIKOM began in April 
1 9 9 1  with a mandate to monitor the Khor Abd Allah waterway and the 
demilitarized zone along the border between Iraq an d Kuwait. The 
mandate was expanded in January 1 993 by SCR 806 with the additio n of 
an infantry battalion. The estimate d annual cost to the United Nations in 
1 9 95 for the UNIKOM peacekeeping operation was $6 3 . 1 million to 
provide a force level of about 1 , 1 00 ,  which has sustained three fatalities. 
20 . UNAVEM II. The UN Angola Verification Mission II, authorized by 
SCR 696 and established in June 1 99 1 , continues through UNAVEM II I .  
When UNAVEM I finishe d, Angola requested assistance from the United 
Nations in implementing cease-fire agreements between its government 
and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) . 
UNI TA resisted acceptance of the re sults of demo cratic elections held 
on 30 September 1 992. UNAVEM II , which lasted until 8 February 
1 99 5 ,  helped to end a 1 6-year c ivil war by providing military personnel 
to observe a cease-fire and by supporting implementation of the "Acor­
dos de Paz. " 
21 . ONUSAL. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador was authorized 
by the Security Council in May 1 9 9 1 by SCR 693. SCR 99 1 , passed in 
April 1 9 95,  terminated ONUSAL's mandate. ONUSAL was a combined 
military and civilian operation that monitored agreements between the 
Salvadoran government and the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti Para la 
Liberacion Nacional) to end more than a decade of civil war. Civilians 
from ONUSAL began work before the declaration of a cease-fire and 
military personnel were sent by the Security Coun cil to help implement 
the agreements. The mandate for ONUSAL was terminated following the 
signing of a program of work to complete the Peace Accord. 
22. * MI NURSO . The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, 
authorized in April 1 99 1 by SCR 690,  became operational in Septemb er 
1 991 . In August 1 9 88, the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front 
(Frente Popular Para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y de Rio de Oro) 
agreed to a settlement plan in the disputed terr itory of Western Sahara to 
determine its political future. MINURS O's mandate is to complete the 
process of identifYing registered voters and to verifY the cessation of 
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ho stilities. The Security Council extended MINURSO's mandate through­
out 1 996 .  MINURSO's 1 995 force level of 379 personnel co st the United 
Nations an estimated $40.5 million.  The MINURSO operation had 
sustained seven fatalities by the end of 1 995 . 
23 . UNAMIC. The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia was launched in 
October 1 9 9 1  by SCR 7 1 7  and terminated in February 1 992 by SCR 745 . 
This advance mission of military observers paved the way for the UN 
Transitional Authority (UNTAC) operation in Cambo dia that immediately 
followed. 
24.  * UNPROFOR . The UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia was 
established in February 1 992 by SCR 743,  primarily with a humanitarian 
assistance mandate . Approximately four years later, UNPROFOR's greatly 
expanded mandate was terminated upon the transfer of its authority to 
IFOR (Implementation Force) . The mandate for IFOR was authorized by 
the Security Council in SCR 1 03 1  on 1 5  Dec ember 1 995 , one day after 
the signing in Paris of the Dayton General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR is a multinational military force 
under unified control that is composed ofbo th Nato and non-Nato units. 
IFOR's legal successor will be a multinational stabilization force (SFOR), also 
under unified co mmand. In SCR 7 1 3 of25 September 1 99 1 , the Security 
Council decided, under Chapter VII, to "immediately implement a general 
and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment 
to Yugoslavia . . . .  " During 1 995 , the complex situation in the former 
Yugoslavia was the subj ect of more than 50 of the 1 29 resolutions  adopted 
and presidential statements issued by the Security Council .  Active involve ­
ment by the Security Council , begun after UN mediation,  with European 
support, produced a cease-fire between the Yugoslav National Army and 
ethnic militias . Warring factions next requested a UN peacekeeping 
op eration to end months of bitter fighting. The operational mandate of 
UNPROFOR was extended to five republics of the former Yugoslavia-Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia----and liaison to a 
sixth, Slovenia. In Croatia, the UN Protection Force was to separate Croatian 
and Krajina Seth forces, maintain cease-fir es, defend four protected areas 
(UNPAs) and assist refugees. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR (with 
Nato air support) was to provide huma.nitarian escort operations,  monitor 
"no fly" zones and six "safe area" zones, and facilitate negotiations between 
the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs.  The goal o f  the negotiations 
is to foster peaceful development of a Bo snian State consisting o f  two 
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entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika 
Sr pska. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPROFOR's 
mandate was for a preventive deployment to keep the co nflict from 
spreading into that country. In SCR 757,  passed in May 1 992, the Security 
Council ac ted un der Chapter VII to imp ose an economic and air boycott 
as well as an embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia an d 
Montenegro) . In SCR 787 , sanctions were exp anded to include a shipping 
embargo. SCR 820 authorized the impoundment and forfeiture of "all 
vessels , freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft belonging to the Fede ral 
Republic of Yugoslavia (S erbia and Montenegro) found violating Security 
Council resolutions. " UNPROFOR police monitors were deployed to 
Macedo nia at the request of the gover nme n t  in the fo rmer Yugoslav 
Republic o f  Macedonia, by S C R  7 9 5 .  In March 1 9 95 , by SCR 982, 
UNCRO in Croatia was separate d fro m  UNPROFOR and, by SCR 98 3, 
UNPREDEP in Macedonia was likewise split off. This restruc turing of 
UNPROFOR left three separate peacekeeping missions under a single 
command (UNPF) . UNPF consists of the UN Confidence Restoration 
Op erations in Cro atia (UNCRO) , the UN Preventive D eployment Force 
(UNPREDEP) within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, an d 
UNMIBH in Bo snia an d Herzegovina. In SCR 1 035 ,  passed on 21  
Dec ember 1 995,  the  Se curity Council established an Internatio nal Police 
Task Fo rce (IPTF) ,  a UN-run civilian police operation called for under 
the Dayton Agreement. Also following the D ayton Agreement, the Coun ­
cil lifted t h e  arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia and suspended the 
sanctio ns imposed in 1 99 2  on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) . The approximate cost to the United Nations for 
UNPROFOR in 1 99 5  was ab out $ 1 . 6  billion,  or about half of the entire 
UN peacekeeping budget. The level of the UNPROFOR fo rces reached 
some 40,000 personnel in 1 995 ,  while 1 92 fatalities  have occurred since 
March 1 9 92.  
25 . UNTAC. The UN Transition al Author ity in Camb o dia deployment 
was authorized in March 1 99 2  by SCR 74 5 ,  and its work was l argely 
completed by the end o f 1 9 9 3 .  U NTAC was established by the Security 
Council to implemen t the Paris Agreements signed on 23 O ctober 
1 9 9 1  by the fo ur warrin g factions in Cambo dia. UNTAC's mandate was 
to consolidate the cease -fire, to help administer the country, an d to 
br ing ab out fre e  and fair elec tions. The Par ty of D emo cratic Kam­
puchea (PDK) fac tion consistently failed to meet its obligations under 
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the Agre ements and did n o t  participate in the electoral process. UNTAC 
ultimately grew to a combined civilian/military deployment of some 
22,000 personnel . UN certified elections were held fro m  23-28 May 
1 99 3 .  S CR 880 noted the adoption of a c onstitution and the termina­
tion ofUNTAC's mandate after the establishment of a n ew government 
on 24 September 1 993 .  
26 . UNOSOM 1 .  The first UN Operation in  So malia was author ized in  
April 1 992 by SCR 75 1 .  Th e mandate was initially set up by the Secur ity 
Council to mo nitor a cease-fire between r ival factions and to provide 
security for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. A weap ons 
embargo impo sed by SCR 733 had proved ineffectual, and the humani­
tarian situation steadily deteriorated. SCR 794 ,  passed in December 1 992, 
author ized Member States to "use all necessary means" to pro tect relief 
operatio ns. A Unified Task Forc e  led by the United States operated with 
a peak strength of 37,000 tro ops until UNOSOM I was terminated in 
March 1 993 by the creation of UN OS OM I I ,  in S CR 8 1 4 . 
27. UNOMSA. Th e  UN Observer Mission in South Africa was established 
in August 1 992 by SCR 772 to monitor implementation of the Natio nal 
Peace Accord. Upon submissio n of the {mal report of the Secretary-Gen­
eral that a "united, non-racial and democratic South Africa" existed, 
UNOMSA was termin ated in June 1 994 by SCR 930. 
28. ONUMOZ. The UN Operation in Mozambique was established by 
the Security Council in December 1 992 by SCR 797 to mo nitor an d 
guarantee the implementation of a general peace agreement between the 
government of Mozambique and the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana 
(RENAMO) that ended 1 4  years of civil war. The agreement included a 
cease-fire, the ho lding of presidential and legislative elections, and a force 
demobilization. Considerable delay in implementation of th e agreement 
occurred, particularly with respect to disarmament of irregular troo ps. In 
SCR 898, the Security Council authorized the deployment of 1 , 1 44 UN 
po lice observers. SCR 957 set 1 5  December 1 9 94 to terminate O NU­
MOZ's mandate as satisfactory elections took place on 27 and 28 October 
1 994 . ONUMOZ's peacekeeping operations actually finished in January 
1 995 .  
29. UNOSOM I I .  The original UN Operation in  Somalia was expanded 
from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and UNOSOM I thro ugh the 
establishment of UNOSOM II in S CR 8 1 4 ,  passed in March 1 993 . 
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UNOSOM II 's  broad mandate was to provide humanitarian assistance, to 
help in the repatr iation of refugees, to assist in the reestablishment of 
infrastructure , to co operate in the removal of mines, and to aid in political 
reconciliation. Acting under Chapter VII ,  the Security Council asked the 
Secretary-General to support the arms embargo using UNOSOM I I 's 
forces and to provide security for repatriation of refugees. The Security 
Council requested the Secretary-General to direct the Force Commander 
of UNOSOM I I to assume responsibility for a phased transition from 
UNITAF to UNOSOM II . On 6 June 1 993 , in SCR 837, the Security 
Council strongly condemned armed attacks by the United Somali Con­
gress forces against UNOSOM II  troops contributed from Pakistan . The 
Security Council reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was authorize d  
t o  take "all necessary measures" against those responsible for the armed 
attacks . The Security Council also encouraged Member States to contrib ­
ute military support t o  meet the fu ll  requirement of a force of 28,000 
personnel. On 22 September 1 993 , in SCR 865,  the Security Council 
called upon the Secretary-General to prepare a detailed plan covering 
UNOSOM's humanitarian, political ,  and security strategy for S omalia. The 
Secretary-General was asked to assist in rebuilding Somali political insti­
tutions and in reestablishing its police, judicial, and penal systems. In SCR 
897, passed in February 1 994,  the Security Council noted "that the people 
of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for setting up viable national 
political institutions and for reconstructing their country. " The Council 
also authorized the reduction of the UNOSOM II force level to 22,000.  
S C R  923 , passed on 31 May 1 9 9 4 ,  contained an acknowledgment of 
"the absence of a government in Somalia . . . .  " In March 1 994,  the leaders 
of maj or Somali factions signed a D eclarat ion of National Reconcil i­
ation. S CR 954 terminated UNOSOM's mandate on 31  March 1 9 95 after 
UNOSOM I I  forces complete d  their withdrawal . 
30 . UNOMUR. The UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda was estab­
lished by SCR 846 in June 1 993 in response to  a request from the two 
governments for the deployment of UN observers along their common 
border. UNOMUR was deployed entirely in Uganda to verify that no 
military assistance reached Rwanda where fighting raged between the 
government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) . The 
Secretary-General also supported the peace efforts of the Organization of 
Mrican Unity (OAU) by providing military experts to assist its Neutral 
Military Observer Group. In May 1 994 , the Security Council extended 
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UNOMUR's observation and monitor ing activities to the entire 
Uganda/Rwanda border. In SCR 928, passed in June 1 9 94 , a phased 
withdrawal was authorized and UNOMUR's mandate was terminated in 
September 1 994. 
3 1 . *  UNOMI G. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia was established in 
August 1 9 9 3  by SCR 858 as a prelude t o  t h e  p o ss ible  es tab lishment 
of a p eacekeeping mission to Abkhazia. A cease-fire agre ement signed on 
27 July 1 9 93 between the Republic of Ge orgia and forces in Abkhazia 
was followed by a Memorandum of Understanding signed on 1 December 
1 993 .  The dispute centers around the future political status of Abkhazia, 
where local authorities tried to separate from the Republic of Georgia. 
On 1 4  May 1 994,  the same parties also signed an Agreemen t on a 
Cease-fire and Separation of Forces. To monitor compliance with the 
cease-fire, a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping 
force was deployed, as requested by the leaders of Ge orgia and Abkhazia. 
The Se cur ity Council, in SCR 937,  increased the strength of UN O MIG's 
military ob server force and exp anded its mandate to monitor the CIS 
peacekeeping operation. The mandate ofUNOMI G extended throughout 
1 9 96, in part to deal with mounting concerns over human rights. The 
approximate annual cost to the United Natio ns for UNO MIG's force of 
1 32 personnel in 1 9 95 was $ 1 0 .9 millio n.  
32 .*  UNOMIL. The UN Observer Mission in Lib eria was established by 
SCR 866 in September 1 9 93 after an embargo on munitions deliver ies to 
Liberia was imposed by the Security Coun cil ,  un der Chapter VI I,  late in 
1 9 92. The Cotonou Peac e Agreement, signed by three warr ing factio ns 
on 25 July 1 993,  assigned to the Economic Community of West African 
States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) the primary resp onsi­
bility to sup ervise implementation of military provisions directed at 
restoring peace, security, and stability in Liberia. The Security Council 
established UNOMIL with a mandate to monitor and verify this process 
and extended its mandate throughout 1 996.  The approximate annual cost 
to the Unite d Nations for UNOMIL's deployment in 1 995 of 9 1  military 
observers was $1 . 1  million. 
33. * UNMIH. The UN Mission in Haiti was authorized in September 
1 993 by SCR 867. From the outset ,  the Security Council charact er ized 
the circumstances in Haiti as "unique and exceptional. "  In an agreement 
signed on Governors Islan d  in New York City, both Haiti's previously 
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exiled president,jean-B ertrand Aristide, and its then co mmander-in-chief 
of the armed forces, Raoul Cedras, requested UN assistance in creating a 
new police force for Haiti and in modernizing its armed forces. In response , 
the Security Council dispatched 567 UN po lice monitors and a 700-per­
son military construction unit to assist Haiti. However, "armed forces" 
there prevented the UNMIH personnel from starting their work. In SCR 
873 , passed in October 1 993 ,  the Security Council determined that the 
failure of the military authorities in Haiti to fulflll their obligations under 
the " Governors I sland Agreement " and to comply with relevant Secur ity 
Council resolutions constituted a " threat to peace and security in th e  
region. " Accordingly, t h e  Security Council reimposed a strict embargo on 
arms and petroleum products that was to remain in effect until demo crati­
cally elected President Ar istide was reinstated and Haiti was in full 
compliance with Security Council resolutions. In May 1 99 4 ,  the Security 
Council imposed further economic sanctions that were not to be lifted 
until senior police and military leaders in Haiti stepped down. At the end 
of july 1 994,  acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, Member States 
were authorized to form a multinational force under unified command 
and control.  Within that framework, the force was authorized to use "all 
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 
leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt 
return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the 
legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and 
maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation 
of the Governors Island Agreement , on the understanding that the cost 
of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the partici­
pating Member States. " As a practical matter, this meant that the multi­
national force that landed on 1 9  September 1 994  was provided and funded 
almost entirely by the United States. It was determined in SCR 975 ,  passed 
in late january 1 99 5 ,  that Haiti was secure and stable, an d plans were 
launched to pass full responsibility from the multinational force to UNMIH 
by 31  March 1 9 9 5 .  Presidential elections were held on 17 December 1 995 
and a new president inaugurated shortly thereafter. The situation generally 
stabilized while the Security Council extended UNMIH's mandate 
throughout 1 99 6. The approximate cost to the United Nations for 
UNMIH in 1 995 was $ 1 . 1  million for an authorized level of personnel of 
6 ,567 .  UNMI H had suffered six fatalities through 1 9 95 .  
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34. UNAMIR.  The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda was established 
by SCR 872 in October 1 9 93 to  assist in implementing the Arusha Peace 
Agreement between the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda and 
the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) . UNAMIR was integrated 
administratively with UNOMUR. On 6 April 1 9 94 ,  however, the presi­
dents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed in an airplane crash , triggering 
large-scale tribal genocide in Rwanda. In mid-May 1 9 94 , by SCR 9 1 8 , 
the Security Council expanded the mandate of UN AMI R  to include the 
creation of secure humanitarian areas and the provision of security for the 
distribution of relief supplies. The Council expressly recognized that 
UNAM I R  personnel might be required to take action in their self-defense 
and authorized a force of up to 5 , 500 troops. An arms embargo was also 
imposed under Chapter VII . The Security Council deplored the displace­
ment of some 1 .5 million Rwandan refugees. In  SCR 929 in June 1 9 94,  
the Council stressed "the strictly humanitarian character of this operation 
which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall 
not constitute an interposition force between the parties. " The Council 
also determined that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis constituted 
a threat to peace and security in the region. The Security Council also 
approved France 's offer to undertake a multinational operation under its 
command and control .  This latter operation, whose cost was borne by the 
Member States participating, was authorized to use "all necessary means 
to achieve the humanitarian objectives . . . .  " UNAM IR's mandate was 
extended by SCR 1 029 in December 1 9 9 5 ,  providing for the withdrawal 
of UNAMIR's forces, starting on 8 March 1 996.  The approximate cost to 
the United Nations for UNAM IR in 1 995 was $ 1 93 . 5  millio n at a strength 
level of 5 ,522 perso nnel. However, in view of the reservations about the 
UN presence expressed by the government of Rwanda in 1 9 95 , the 
mandate was adjusted to further reduce force levels. UNAMI R had 
sustained 26 fatalities through 1 995.  
35 . UNASOG.The UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group was established by 
the Security Council in May 1 99 4  by S CR 9 1 5 . The mandate was to 
observe the implementation of the Surt Agreement signed by Chad and 
Libya on 4 April 1 994 and to carry out the judgment of the International 
Court of Justice relating to their disputed territories around the Aouzou 
Strip. UNASOG's mission was successfully completed, and its man date 
accordingly terminated by SCR 926 in June 1 9 94 . 
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3 6 . *  UNMOT. The UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan \.Vas authorized 
in December 1 99 4  by SCR 968. UNMOT's mandate was regularly ex­
tended and UNMOT's activities continued through 1 996.  UNMOT is to 
assist the Tajik government, as well as its opposition,  in monitoring 
implementation of a cease-fIre and in facilitating political discussions. A 
Commonwe alth of Independent States peacekeeping force, largely com­
posed of Russian troops, has been deployed alon g  the Tajikistan border 
with Afghanistan since 1 99 3 .  The estimated annual cost to the United 
Nations for the 44 military observers was Sl . 1  million in 1 99 5 .  UNMOT 
had suffere d one fatality as of the end of 1 995 .  
37 . *  UNAVEM I I I .  The U N  Angola Ver ification Mission provided for in 
SCR 976 was established in February 1 99 5 .  A new mandate for the 
peacekeeping operation in Angola \.Vas given, based on the Secretary-Gen­
eral 's recommendation that more than 7,000 peacekeepers help rebuild 
the country. UNAVEM Il l 's mandate is to supervise implementation of the 
"Acordos de paz" and the Lusaka Protocol between the Angolan govern­
ment and the National Union for the Total Indep endence of Angola 
(UNITA) . The Secretary-General deployed peacekeepers in May and 
August 1 995 , and UNAVEM I I I 's mandate was extended through 1 99 6 .  
3 8 .  * UNMIB H. The UN Mission in B osnia and Herzegovin a was 
established by S CR 1 03 5  in December 1 9 9 5 .  The International Police 
Task Force  (IPTF) , a part of UNMIBH, continued its mission through 
1 99 6 ,  carrying out the tasks set out in Annex II of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. In particular, IPTF will assist in the restructur ing of law 
enforcement agencies in B o snia and Herzegovina. 
3 9 . *  UNCRO. The UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia \.Vas 
established in SCR 9 8 1 , passed in March 1 995 . UNCRO \.Vas separated 
from UNPROFOR. whose mandate was to ensure the demilitar ization of 
the UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) through th e withdrawal or disbandment 
of all armed forces and to protect personnel in the UNPAs. The deployment 
of UNCRO military observers was authorized in April 1 995 by SCR 9 90. 
with the mandate to control . monitor. and report on the borders between 
Croatia and its neighbors. In particular. emphasis \.Vas placed on normal­
izing relations between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
concerning the disputed issues pertaining to the Prevlaka peninsula. At 
the end of 1 995 , of UNCRO's 1 , 5 00 personn el. 1 6  had suffered fatalities .  
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40.*  UNPREDEP. The UN Preventive D eploymen t Force for the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which arose out ofSCR 983,  and passed 
in March 1 99 5 ,  changed UNPROFOR in Macedonia to UNPREDEP.The 
man date of UNPREDEP remain s largely as originally set in SCR 795, 
passed in December 1 992. UNPRE DEP is  to keep armed conflict from 
spreading to the former Yugoslavia Republic of M acedonia from either 
of its ne ighbors, Albania or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) . The expectation is that there will be a peaceful demarcation 
of the border between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNPREDEP's mandate was extended 
through 1 996 to maintain stability. UNPRE DEP consists of 1 , 1 50 military 
personnel and 23 civilian policemen . UNPRE DEP forces had sustained 
four fatalities by the end of 1 995 . 
4 1 . UN TAE S . The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, 
B aranj a, and We stern Sirmium was e stablish e d  in S CR 1 037 , p assed in 
January 1 99 6. A "B asic Agreement" on th e re gion was signe d in 
Novemb er 1 995 by the government of th e Republic of Croatia an d 
the local Serb community to facilitat e the peac e ful re turn of the 
territories to Croatia. UNTAES'  peacekeeping mandate is to promot e 
confiden ce amo ng all ethnic  gro ups , monitor demilitar ization and 
refugees,  and promote peaceful int egration dur ing the transition.  The 
man dat e of UNTAES extended thro ugh 1 9 96.  
42. MINUGUA. The UN Mission for the Verific ation of H uman Rights 
and of Compliance with the Compreh ensive Agreement on Human 
Rights in Guatemala was established in S CR 1 0 94 passed 20 January 1 997.  
The mandate of MINUGUA i s  to verify observance of the peace accords 
between the government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria 
Nacional Guatemalteca (URN G) that started in early 1 994.  SCR 1 094 
authorized 1 55 mil itary observers and re quisite me dical personnel to 
verify a ce ase-fire and demobilize URNG forces. 
N.B. UNTAES and MINUGUA were mandated by the Se cur ity Council after the general 




Context for Reforming Peacekeeping M a ndates 
Traditional Peacekeeping Operations 
If N CHAPTE R II , atte ntion was drawn to the "pe acekeep ing" label that has 
JLbeen placed on a wide variety o f  missi o ns, some of which were c arried out 
concurrently with humanitarian and enforcement action operations. In  tradi ­
tional peacekeeping deployments, at least four types of o perations can be 
distilled from UN practice. 
Observation operations, as the name implies, are to observe, monitor, verify and 
report. This has been the most frequently used peacekeeping activity. UN observers 
are customarily unarmed, but there are circumstances where limited personal 
self-defense capabilities are necessary. Observer groups typically consist of military 
offic ers and equivalent civilians. The size of the force may range from a few to 
several hundred personnel . Missions may in clude observing cease-fire and 
demarcation lines, confirming withdrawal of foreign forces, monitoring for war 
preparations, reporting human rights abuses, verifying election processes, and 
inspecting for agreement compliance.An effective observer operation requires close 
liaison with the involved p arties to maintain trust and to minimize incidents. 
Regular patrolling and the manning of observation posts further di;;courages armed 
conflict. 
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Interpositional operatio ns try to ke e p  opposing fo rces  separate d .  T h i s  
op eration is often deploye d immediately after t h e  termination o r  susp ension 
of ho stilitie s .  The pe acekeepers .  wh o are typically lightly arme d, are po si­
tioned be tween the b elligerents to create a buffer zone.  The ab sence of dire ct 
contact between ho stile fo rc e s  is intended to h elp the partie s n e go t iate a 
l onger term peac e  settlemen t.  A gain , the size o f  the forc e  varies with th e 
lo cati on and the number of comb atan ts.  Interpo sition fo rces may h ave to 
move in quickly, espe cially to o c cupy key terrain . Op eratio ns involve 
patrolling actively, establishing ch e ckp o ints ,  and reacting promp tly. If ten­
sions de cre ase sufficiently, interpo sitional operations may reve rt to  more 
passive observer functio ns. 
Transition assistance op erations can help a nation move to a stable p o litical 
condition and a more peaceful existence after a struggle for independence or 
civil strife . Th e peacekeeping force may consist of police elements to contain 
violence and fo ster a return to normal life .  The warfare may h ave lett the co untry 
impoverished,  and assistance may be expected from the peacekeepers in 
restoring infrastructure. Tasks may include civil administration ,  control of armed 
militia , co lle ctio n and confiscation of weapons, disarmament of military forces ,  
supervisio n o f  electio ns, maintenance of cease-fire zones, humanitarian aid and 
refugee assistance. Transition assistance operations typically re quire a large force 
with diverse capabilities. Personnel may or may no t carry arms, dep ending on 
the danger involved, an d UN activities may be under eith er military or civilian 
co ntrol .  Effective co ordination with o ther elements of the peacekeeping 
op eration as well as with the local leaders in the host State is essential.  As the 
situation stabilizes, civilian le aders should increasingly assume control from 
military co mmanders. 
Preventive deployment normally occurs when the government or governments 
in whose territory the operation is to be conducted re quest the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces there to head off armed conflict.  The peacekeep ers may 
take up po sitions on both sides of a border, or even one side of a border, to 
discourage hostilities. Preven tive deployment may include ground tro ops on 
the border or air and maritime forces patrol ling far from specific conflict areas. 
Part of the mandate may be to demonstrate a " show offorce," fe atur ing military 
resolve, to discourage unwanted deployment of armed forces or to encourage 
nego tiations on a political settlement. Operations may include patrolling and 
high visibility military training ac tivities. 
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The UN and the Evolvi ng European Security Structure 
As outlined in Chapter I of this study, the legal and institutional structure for 
decision making in the UN Charter sets parameters for the conduct of b o th 
traditional peacekeeping and genuine enforcement actions. In the most basic 
sense, the Charter entrusts the Security Council with the primary responsibility 
to maintain international peace and security. The Se curity Council alone is 
expressly granted the power to authorize collective responses by UN Members, 
by passing resolutions that mandate enforcement actions, including the use of 
military force. As previously noted, the term "peacekeeping" is not mentioned 
anywhere in the UN Charter. A definition of these operations, therefore ,  must 
be discerned from what the United Natio ns has done and what its Member 
States have supported over the past 5 0  years. The legitimacy of the operations 
depends, however, not only on what is done and is tolerated, but also upon 
whether the activit ies comport with the purposes and allocations of power 
provided in the Charter itself. The point  is that the legal standards in the UN 
Charter must be met.  The Charter remains the constitution for UN activities. 
I t  is no t legally sufficient merely to note:  "It 's alright because the United Natio ns 
did it and nobody complained. " The core idea about the rule oflaw in this area 
is that the Charter must be respected by UN Members just as the United States 
Constitution must be resp ected by U S. citizens. In the Unite d N ations, 
legitimacy der ives from the agreement made by the Member Stat es, just as in 
the United States legitimacy comes from the consent of  the governed citizens 
wh ose pact is expressed in the  US.  Constitution. It is not enough that 
government officials, temporarily in power, want to do something or even have 
done something without significant objection.  Respect for the rule of law 
requires a thoughtful examination of the purposes and the allocations of power 
within the constituting document , viewed as a whole. Only after an assessment 
of the Charter text and whether the practice in question is consistent with it , 
can a determination be properly made whether past and future "peacekeeping" 
operations actually comport with the agreements made by the sovereign State 
Members. Unlike the US. domest ic judicial review of constitutional issues, there 
is no review provided in the Charter for S ecurity Council substantive decisions 
if the Security Council acts in accordance with its procedures. For example, the 
Security Council determined that the circumstances in Haiti constituted a threat 
to international peace and security. In one sense, this determination is all that 
is legally required. The procedures in the Charter are met.  But another view is 
that substantive standards in the Charter still must be met, even if the procedures 
available for substantive review are not  particularly effect ive. The idea is that 
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respect for the rule oflaw dictates that Security Council acti ons that are properly 
done as a matter of procedure are still op en to substantive challenge. The 
princ iple that ought no t to be lost in the rush of any crisis is that all nations ,  
persons, and institutio ns must follow both the pro cedures and substantive 
standards of the rule oflaw, esp ecially in the realm of UN peacekeep ing in which 
use of force may be involved. The notio n is straightforward: if it is the law, all 
must ob ey it. If the law is bad, change it . But to ignore law is to negate the force 
of the rule oflaw. And without the rule of law, the commitments in the Charter 
are meaningless. Nations either follow law, or they do not. In principle, there is 
no "pick an d choose" option to suit political convenience.  
Th e 40 UN peacekeeping operations officially designated as such through 
th e end of 1 995 are outlined in Chap ter I I  of this study. The wide variety of 
activities revealed in this survey reinfo rces th e conclusion that there are few 
universally followed rules governing eith er tradition al peacekeep ing or UN 
enforc ement ac tions. Lack of doctr inal clarity does not, however, deter the 
Security Council from regularly adopting resolutions mandating peacekeeping 
operations . Unfortunately, the Se curity Council often does not  clearly distin ­
guish be tween consensual operations and enforcement ac tions. 
Article 97 of the UN Chart er specifically labels the Se cretary-General as the 
"Chief Admin istrative Officer" of the United Nations. In the realm of 
peacekeeping practice , however, the Se cretary-General has also assumed resp on­
sibility for the organization, conduct,  and direc tion of military operations. When 
these duties entail ext ensive use of armed force,  they can hardly be deemed 
purely " administrative " in any ordinary sense . Rath er, these resp onsibilities are 
akin to those of the Commander-in-Ch ief under the Constitution of the United 
St ates. If this seems odd, recall that a leading role fo r the Military Staff 
Committee in plannin g for th e Se curity Counc il's use of armed force was 
envisioned in th e UN Charter. As we have seen , this proved politically imprac­
tical to implement. Although it is obvious that these duries ought to be 
p erformed by military professionals , an d the Military Staff Committee has the 
p otential to provide that service, th ere is no "hue and cry" to breathe life int o  
t h e  Committee, a t  least n o t  t o  the extent t h e  Charter provide s .  A n  alternative 
appro ach ,  to take advantage of th e renewed coo peration among the Permanent 
Five on secur ity matters, is for the United Nations to channel more enforcement 
actions into Chapter VIII  "region al  organizations . "  Member States, after all, do 
have professio nal military personnel who can be made available t o  deal with 
UN use of fo rce problems under Secur ity Council direction. The mo st influ­
ential Chapter VIII regional alliances pertain to Europe. And, while not  a 
Chapter VI II  entity, th e most fo rmidable military organization in the world , 
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Nato, is lo cated there. Th e Security Council understandably has turned to Nato 
for help on the UN's most pressing security problem, the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia. As we previously no ted, however, using Nato as a Chapter VI II  
enforcement entity is  a legal problem, since Nato was no t set  up to serve under 
the Security Council as a colle ctive security organization. 
By contrast , the "Helsinki Summit Declaration" of 1 0 July 1 992 made it clear 
that the Council of the Conferenc e  on Security and Cooperation in Euro pe 
(CSCE) was willing to undertake peacekeeping operatio ns un der Chapter VII I  
i n  cases o f  conflict within or among participating States. Th e Council i s  the 
central dec ision-making and governing body of the Conference,  and it meets 
annually at either the Heads of Government or Foreign Minister level . B etween 
Council me etings, the Committe e  of Senior Officials or its Permanent Com­
mittee in Vienna is responsible for management and decision making. In 
principle, decisions are made by consensus. The CSCE , which was create d in 
1 9 75 , was expanded to include not only the United S tates, Canada, and almo st 
all European States but also all of the newly independent States of the former 
Soviet Unio n. In 1 995 , the CSCE was renamed the " Organization for Security 
and Co operation in Europe,"  and its acronym changed to OSCE. 
The 52 Members of the oseE quality, in their collective capacity, as a 
"Regional Arrangement" under Chapter VII I  of the UN Charter. As such, the 
UN Charter provides that the Security Council may delegat e  authority to the 
OSCE to take enforcement action on behalf of the United Nations. Nato , in 
turn, has offered to provide military support for OSCE peacekeeping operations. 
From an international law po int of view, there is no thing to preclude Nato from 
serving as a contributing entity to an OSCE peacekeeping operatio n. U. S. 
domestic law is another matter. The OSCE organization itself can play a direct 
role in conflict prevention activities such as fact-fmding, mediation, and coop­
eration with other security organizations. Given its  long experience,  expertise,  
and available resources to support large -scale military operations,  Nato is 
uniquely qualified, in a practical sense, to carry out peacekeeping assignments 
that require the use of any significant military force. To repeat, however, Nato was 
no t  set up to operate under the Security Council, as is required by Chapter VII I .  
I n  De cember 1 99 1 , a t  the European Community summit i n  Maastricht , a 
dual role for the Western European Union (WEU) was announced. The WE U  
i s  t o  embody the European defense entity and t o  function a s  the European pillar 
within Nato. The ten -nation defense wing ofWEU forces  (out of the 1 5 -nation 
European Union) are to be multinational ,  including the EUROCORPS (French­
German) , EUROFOR (French, Italian,  Spanish,  and Portuguese forces  for rapid 
reaction in the southern region) , and EUROMARFOR (all-Member maritime 
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force} . These formations will be subordinate to Nato when they operate under 
it. However, it is likely to be only a matter of time until Nato assets will be used 
for peacekeeping and o ther military operations  under the auspices of the WEU. 
The WEU de termined that WEU Members may not  invoke the automatic 
military assistance provisions between WE U Members against a Nato Member 
nor may Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty be invoked against a WE U  
Member. Se tting aside the vexing question o f  who has binding authority to 
interpret conflicts between WEU and Nato mandates, there is, without doubt, 
an overlap between the respective security roles now given to the EU and Nato. 
Any resulting confusion may be attributed to the fact that there is, as yet ,  no 
agreed upon policy among all th e Member nations on the respective security 
and defense roles to be played by each organization. For that matter, there is no 
agreed upon strategy for international security in th e North Atlantic region . 
The United States, for its part, has made it clear that Nato is the avenue through 
which security consultations are to be made and major issues determined. It  
remains to be seen how long this U.S.  policy can be sustained. Partisan political 
controversy is likely to emerge in the Unite d States over Nato 's role,  especially 
as the real financial costs in Bosnia surface. I t  is possible that a coalition of 
like-minded States may form between European Powers to assume (and pay 
for) a greater role in European security. A conservative U.S.  Congress may even 
be happy to have them do so. 
Another potential Chapter VIII  regional organization in Europe is the North 
Atlantic Co operation Council (NACC) , whose genesis was in the Declaration 
on Peace and Cooperation issued at the Nato Summit Meeting in November 
1 991 . NACC's primary role is to serve as the vehicle for western European 
support for reform occurring in the countries of central and eastern Europe . 
Nato Members were in favor of the steps bein g taken toward democratic reform 
and invited the natio ns concerned to participate in appropriate forums. The 
States of the former Soviet Union and post-Co mmunist Europe j o ined the 
NACC, enlarging its membership to thirty-eight. This opened another new, 
post-Cold War venue for contact and consultation with countries, such as 
Russia, about military matters, includin g peacekeeping. NACC has the potential 
to be a Chapter VIII  regional organization , but as a matter of state d policy, NACC 
itself currently has no operational role in peacekeeping. In fact,  Nato leaders 
decided in 1 992 to operate out of the region only under UN or OSCE mandate. 
For example, the Nato-led operation in Bosnia, which clearly is not in the 
territory of any Nato Members, is under UN mandate . 
In Chapter I of this study, it was no ted that Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty provides that an armed attack against any Party's territory in Europe or 
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North America shall be considered an attack against all Nato Parties. Nato was 
create d  to provide a collective secur ity bulwark against aggression by Warsaw 
Pact Members, esp ecially the Soviet Union.  However, when the Warsaw Pact 
disintegrated,  the collective self-defense rationale , upon which Nato was 
founded under Article 5 1  of the Charter, came into question. The original 
reasons for a Nato military organization to protect against an armed attack from 
the Soviet  Union no longer existed . There are , of course, new threats, and few 
suggest that Nato be immediately disbanded .  At the same time, Nato is under 
scrutiny; it inevitably must be reformed to respond to the new European security 
environment. The Cold War Nato, constituted under the North Atlantic Treaty 
as an Article 5 1  self-defense organization, is at the threshold o f  a period of 
adjustment . 
In recognition of this reality, the Nato summit in January 1 994 endorsed the 
concept of Combined Joint Task Forces an d launched the Partnership for Peace 
initiative. The Combined Joint Task Force concept envisions a military operation 
using elements of the alliance's command structure but drawing forces only 
from Members willing to contribute .  Twenty-two non-Nato countries, with 
diverse languages and cultures, have started to cooperate along these lines with 
Nato in various ways. Their first jo int exercise, "Co-operative Bridge," was held 
in September 1 994. Th e Nato Partnership for Peace/ Combined Joint Task Force 
Program was expected to provide the princ ipal means to integrate non-Nato 
troops into UN peacekeeping operations. With this in mind, Nato's Secretary­
General released a study in mid-1 995 on the question of Nato's enlargement 
eastward. The Partnership for Peace initiative had grown to 26 Members, 
includin g all 1 5  of the former Soviet republics. Although no decision on the 
admission of new parties to the North Atlantic Treaty is expected until 1 9 97 , 
or later, the importance of Nato's future membership raises critical security 
questions. Should former enemies of Nato become parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty without completely rethinking Nato ? What security threats does the 
Treaty now guard against? What type of collective security organization, if any, 
is needed for the new Europe? Would Russia ever agree to an expanded Nato ? 
How ab out a less threatening N ato or Nat o plus partners? Wo uld Russia put 
its troops directly under Nato command? Likewise, would the Unite d  States 
put its troops under th e operational command of Russians in some form of an 
expanded Nato ? What are the costs and time-frames to integrat e applicant States'  
personnel , equipment , and doctrine into a revised Nato ? What will be the 
financial cost to the West for expanding Nato membership eastward?  Would 
current Nato nations be willing to commit to take action in ethnic strife 
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between States or groups located in the former Warsaw Pact nations? In the 
final analysis,  would expansion of Nato stabilize or destabilize Europe? 
From a domestic U.S. perspective, would Congress approve new Nato 
Members from the former Communist East? What would be the financial or 
other costs to secure the vo tes of all 15 other Members of Nato who must agree 
to new Members as required by the North Atlantic Treaty? 
The Nato alliance has enormous political, economic, and military significance, 
not only for Europe but also for the world. Nato nations rightly ought to proceed 
cautiously on expansion to avoid creating unrealistic expectations. Political rhetoric 
is important and symbolic generalizations to garner public support have their place. 
But Nato is in the business of life or death on a vast scale. Serious issues such as 
this merit open de bate at the highest policy levels between the nations concerned 
and between the Clinton administration and the U.S. Congress. It is not clear that 
this debate has been encouraged. In any case, political acceptance as well as 
integration will be a slow process. Greater relative responsibility for Europeans in 
providing for their own defense may be one emerging trend. In the meantime, 
Nato has offered to play the role of executive agent for both the United Nations 
and, as noted above, for the OSCE, either in traditional peacekeeping or in Charter 
enforcement operations. 
One practical response by Nato to the new security environment in Europe 
was to adopt the concept of the Rapid Response Corps.  First , Allied Mobile 
Forces are to meet the need fo r small , immediate interven tion operations. The 
next larger group is the Atlantic Alliance's Rapid Response Corps (ARRC) , 
co nsisting of units from thirteen countries as of 1 995 . The ARRC is to be ready 
for action within one to two weeks after notice. The third level is Nato's principal 
defense forces in the nations of the sixteen Parties .  The final military force is 
composed of reinforcements resulting from mobilization in individual Nato 
States. The ARRC is thus the main peacekeeping force available fo r crisis 
management planning in N ato. Plans are for the ARRC to have ten divisions 
amounting to 400,000 troops? Some units will be genuinely multinational,  
while others will be formed principally, or entirely, from one country. 
Peacekeeping Termi nology 
An important element in formulating mandates for peacekeeping operations 
that may be commanded by the United Nations or by Nat o nations is agreed 
upon terms and defmitions pertaining to the use offo rce .  The starting point for 
analysis on this topic is the outlook at the United Nations that is provided in 
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's discussion of peace support 
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operations in "An Agenda for Peace. ,,8 This pamphlet, which was published in 
July 1 992, defmes four types of operations: 
Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes fro m  ar ising betwe en parties, 
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread 
of conflicts when they occur. 
Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through 
such peaceful means as those fo reseen in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. 
Peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN presen ce in the fleld, hitherto with 
the consent of all the parties c oncerned.  normally involving UN military 
and/or  police personnel and fre quently c ivilians as well . 
Peacebuilding is action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.  
In a supplement to "An Agenda for Peace, " dated 3 January 1995 , the 
Secretary-General identifies six "Instruments for Peace and Security. "  These 
are : preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace­
building, disarmament, sanctions, and enforcement action.
9 
With respect to  
peacekeeping, the Secretary-General states: " [C] ertain basic pr inciples of peace­
keeping are essential to its success. Three particularly important principles are 
the consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of fo rce except in 
self-defense. Analysis of recent successes and failures shows that in all the 
successes those principles were respected and in most of the less successful 
. 
h h f h 
, , 1 0  
operations one or  t e ot  er  0 t em was not. 
The Secretary-General went on to observe that "the logic of peace-keeping 
flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of 
enforcement . . . .  To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the 
viability of th e peace-keeping operation and endanger its personnel. " 1 1  The 
Secretary-General and his Secretariat obviously learned important lessons from 
UN peacekeeping experiences during the period from 1 992, when "An Agenda 
for Peace" was published, and 1995, when the "Supplement " was issued. More 
realistic attitudes by the Secretary-General on peacekeeping operations are, 
indeed, welcome. Now the trick will be to persuade Security Council Members, 
particularly the United States ,  to be more disciplined in formulating and issuing 
peacekeeping mandates. 
In the 1 995 Supplement, the Secretary-General highlights the difference 
between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions by listing the latter 
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last in his new hierarchy of instruments fo r peace an d security. Peacekeeping 
and enfo rcement action are not simply lumped together under a peacekeeping 
heading; three other listings are delibe rately placed in between . Interestingly, 
the word "hitherto " (see above) is omitted in the mo re rec ent reference to the 
co nsent requirement in peacekeeping. This is not a mere drafting point but a 
signal of significan ce. One may conclude that the Secretary-General is express­
ing a renewed appreciation of th e necessity fo r consent in peacekeeping 
ope rations that he supervises .  However, the Secretary-General still clings to the 
ho pe that the United Nations, as such , "in the long run "  will develop the 
capacity to "deploy, direct,  command and control" enforcement operatio ns.
1 2  
Given no mention of a time frame , su ch theoretical musing i s  probably harmless , 
but it is still misguided .  The Secretary-General is not set up, politically, 
institutionally, legally, financially, or in any other way, to provide command an d 
control for enforcement action operatio ns.  On the one hand, the Secretary­
General appears to recognize this point; on the other han d, he keeps the flame 
flickering to accept enforcement assignments from the Security Council .  
T h e  thinking of the N o rth Atlantic Military Committee of the NACC o n  
combined peacekeepin g ope rations i s  discussed in a March 1 994 paper entitle d  
" Cooperation i n  Planning . "  1 3  This document may n ow be overtaken b y  events, 
but it still contains useful insights fo r the purposes of this study. The goal of this 
unclassified paper was to provide a common NACC basis for peacekeeping 
planning. These Planning Guidelines were based o n  the principles, cr iter ia, and 
defmitions in the NACC Ad Hoc Group (NACC-AHG) Report endorsed by 
the Ministers in Athens, Greece, on 1 1  June 1 9 9 3 .  This is a helpful guide to 
discuss issues that must be considered in formulating Secur ity Co uncil mandates 
for combined multinatio nal "peacekeeping" operations. 
The first problem encountered by the " Cooperation in Peac ekeeping Plan ­
ning Working Group " was a need for agreement between the United N ations 
and th e OSCE o n  terminology and defmitions abo ut use of fo rc e terms in 
peacekeeping. Consideration was given to using the UN Sec retary- Ge neral's 
term "peace support operations " as a general cover-term to describe all 
operations in suppo rt of the United N ations, e .g. , co nflict prevention , peace­
making, peacekeeping, humanitar ian aid , peace enforcement, and peace-buil d­
ing. Proponents urged that the generic term covered all types of operatio ns , 
emphasized the importance of peacekeeping expansion ,  recognized the diffi­
culty in separating the range of operations, and met the demand for options 
beyond traditional peacekeeping. 
The term was no t adopted by the Working Group, however, because it is not 
in common use and acceptan ce. The belief was that even when it  was used, it 
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was used inconsistently. Moreover, the t erm "peace support operations" glossed 
over the fact that conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace-building, and hu­
manitarian aid in the first instan ce, peacekeeping in the second instance,  and 
enforcement measures in the third instance, while inter-related, are very 
different. Moreover, and this was important for the Working Group, as "peace 
support operations" included "peace enforcement,"  the term exceeded the 
accepted scope of the NACC's policy mandate. This po int might well be noted 
by the UN Secretary-General as well. The Group's main substantive concern, 
however, was about blurring the distinction between "peacekeeping" and 
"peace enforcement ,"  and with the ambiguity and vagueness that results. The 
NACC-AHG stressed that the main difference between "peacekeeping" and 
"peace enforcement " was the consent of the parties and impartiality in the first 
case and the application of warfighting or coercive techniques in the sec ond 
case. The chairman of the AHG emphasized that another important distinction 
was not the level of violence, but rather the change in the status of the 
combatants that occurs when enforcement troops take a side in the conflict . 
Again, the UN Secretary-General as well as the IFOR co mmanders ought to  
pay close attention to this point . 
The difficulties with the expression "peace enforcement" have already been 
stressed throughout this study. Despite its widespread popularity, the t erm is a 
misnomer whose meaning obfuscates rather than clarifies thinking. While the 
look and sound of the phrase may appeal to  the public at large, it is r ife with 
mischief from misunderstanding. This is immediately evident by noting the 
contradiction between the words "peace " and "enforcement ."  If there is peace, 
what is there to enforce? If enforcement is required, how can peace be said to 
exist? It is easier to understand the concept of a peace to be kept than one that 
must be enforced or "implemented. " Use of misleading terminology just to  
keep the term "peace " in the label should be discouraged, for i t  blurs the essential 
legal dist inction under the Charter between traditional peacekeeping practices 
and genuine Chapter VII or VI II enforcement actions. Not surprisingly, the UN 
Charter is not the source of the phrase "peace enforcement . "  Rather, the UN 
Charter term that refers to general Chapter VII authorizations is "enforcement 
measures. " The specific term, embodied in Article 42, to connote even great er 
use of armed force against a non-consenting party is "enforcement action. " 
These Charter terms are used correctly in this study wherever po ssible. The 
term "enforcement measures , "  taken from Article 41 , refers to coercive means 
such as econo mic sanctions, interruption of communications, and diplomatic 
pressures. It  is also broad enough to  include more direct use of military force . 
For this latter idea, however, the term "enforcement action," taken from Article 
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42, is even more accurate and is use d in this study when the narrOwer meaning 
is intended. 
Nato Peacekeeping Mand ates 
Principles . As we have seen,  part of the reason that the term "peaceke eping" 
suffers trom imprecisio n is that the concept derived from UN and State practice , 
no t from express terms in the Charter. The advantage of the loose, ordinary 
sen se in which it is commonly employe d by the press and the general public is 
that the term conveys an idea that people perceive they understand. It is for that 
reason that the expression "peacekeeping operation" is used in this study to 
enc ompass both traditional peacekeeping and enforcement operations. I t  is 
stresse d, however, that these two phrases refer to markedly different concepts 
under the UN Charter-the former to be run by the Secretariat and the latter 
by the Security Council. The most important result is that a traditional 
peacekeeping mandate implies, in principle, no need for the use of armed force 
while an enforcement action mandate authorizes ,  in pr inciple , the use of armed 
force . Looked at in another way, traditional peacekeepers operate at the behest 
of all th e parties to the conflic t or dispute.  Enforcement troops, by co ntrast, are 
tasked to enforce the will of th e Se curity Council on the non-consenting 
factions or States. 
When Nato leaders decided in 1 99 2  that Nato would undertake peacekeep­
ing operations out of the region only under UN or OSeE mandate, this de cision 
was consistent with Nato 's status as an Article 51 (Chapter VII) self-defense 
organization as distinguishe d  trom an Article 53 (Chapter VIII) collective 
security organization. But the door was left open for Nato to undertake 
peacekeeping operations within the region either as it was or as an expanded 
Nato, or as a regional organization composed of both Nato members and new 
"partners" from the former Soviet bloc. We now see IFOR operating outside 
the Nato treaty region in Bosnia and there is also discussion about using Nato 
forces clearly outside the Parties' territories in Nato's southern flank. Whatever 
form multilateral peacekeeping operations take within th e Nato environment, 
development of a common doctrine for the use of armed force must be a 
priority. Join t exerci�es with diverse nation participation are highly desirable 
prior to an actual military deployment. Moreover, at the moment,  they seem 
to play well politically. This enc ourages even greater efforts at co ordination 
among the prosp ective nations, and that i s  all to the go od. However, war games 
are not the same as actual engagement in arme d  conflict. An expanded Nato 
has a long way to go before new members will o perate smoothly in truly ho stile 
46 
"What Color Helmet? 
situations without creating unacceptable dangers. A cco rdin gly, careful attention 
ought to be given to the framing of Security Council man dates and the essential 
operating requirements to impl ement them well before the time arrives to 
deploy such Nato forces in combat. 
Based on th e forego ing review of the UN Ch arter and subsequent peacekeep­
ing practice, the author concludes that a Se curity Council mandate fo r any 
combined multinational peacekeeping operatio n that might invo lve traditional 
peacekeeping as well as enfo rcement measures,  po ssibly including expanded 
Nato military forces , ought to include th e following pr inciples: 
1 .  Peacekeeping operatio ns will be carried out only at the request an d under 
the authority of either the UN Security Council under Chapter VII or the 
oseE under Chapter VII I .  
2. The UN Security Co uncil o r  the OSCE will co nsult with contributing 
States on a case-by-case basis to determine command and co ntrol arrangements 
tailored to each peacekeeping operation. 
3.  Peac ekeeping operations will be undertaken only to support the achieve ­
ment of clearly defined and agreed upon political objectives as determin ed by 
the UN S ecurity Council or OSCE mandating autho rity. 
4 .  Peacekeeping operatio ns will have clearly establishe d conditions for with ­
drawal, termination, or escalatio n. 
5. Firm financial commitments to pay for the peac ekeeping operatio ns will 
be agreed upon before military forces deploy. 
Operating Requirements . The distinction between peacekeeping and 
enfo rcement action is fundamentally important for yet another reason.  The 
status of individuals under international law is directly linked to their use or 
no nuse of armed fo rce. Consistent with that l ine of reaso ning, traditio nal 
peac ekeeping fo rc e s o ught to enj oy the status of n eutral s ,  while multinational 
forces engaged in UN enforcement actio n ought to be treate d as combatants . 
Despite the obvious nee d  for clarity on this matter, Nato as well as other 
Member State forces may be tasked to perform operations bro adly labeled as 
"peacekeeping" which , in fact,  co nsist of a mixture of activities ranging from 
humanitarian assistance to full-fledged enforcement actio n. In this setting, 
Daniel and Hayes have identified a spe ctrum of operations with thre e ben ch­
marks: traditional peacekeeping, inducement, and enfo rcement.
1 4  
They propose 
thoughtful reco mmendatio ns to deal ,  in particular, with what they refer to as 
inducement operations in the "middle gro und."  
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The mixed "war-peace " setting is, indeed, the central pro ble m that must be 
addressed in developing ration al mandates to guide multinational military fo rce!1-
engaged in peacekeeping operatiom. The problem i!1- mO!1-t acute in !1-ituatio m 
where a wide range of UN-sanctio ned activities i!1- underway in the same are a 
at the same time. The metho dology cho sen in thi!1- study, to stimulate discU!1.!1-io n 
on how multin ational fo rc es ough t to o perate in "middle gro und" settings ,  fint 
dist inguishes three groups by the colon of their helmet!1-. For discussion 
purpose!1-, "White Helme ts" are declared to be noncombatant!1-.  "Blue Helmets" 
are the traditional, neutral UN peacekeep ers. " Green H elmet!1-" are the normal 
military combatan ts maintained by Me mber S tates. 
The foremost requirement for any peacekeeping mis!1-ion is a clearly defined 
objective. If th e mandate i!1- not easily understo od, or if the guidance from 
political author ities keeps changing, or if the military go als are ambiguous or 
co ntradictory, peacekeeping forces will be confused.  In ad dition,  the tro ops of 
co ntending factio ns may become confuse d. Confused tro o ps are prone to make 
deadly mistakes. Accordingly, the designate d colle ctive secur ity co mman d an d  
its contr ibuting M embers must co mult early and often t o  ensure that the 
mandate for the p eacekeeping op eratio n is fully understood at all levels. Fro m 
the out!1-e t, the operatio nal commander must know what is expected to ensure 
that suitable forces are !1-elected for th e specifIC nilssion. Once underway, " nils!1-ion 
creep" sho uld occur o nly by deliberate po litical decision. The temptation to be 
helpful will sometimes be overwhelming for commander!1- on the !1-cene ,  but it 
must be resisted if th e proposed activity does not contribute directly to 
accompli!1-hment of the mi!1-sion.  
A second requirement, which applies only in the traditional peacekeeping 
op eration, is that the Blue H elmet!1- must remain m ictly neutral and impartial . 
The credibility of UN forces as unbiased repre!1-entatives o f all natio ns preserving 
peace rests on conduct by its individual commanders and th eir tro ops that is , 
and i!1- perceived by the disputant!1- to be, even-handed. The Blue Helmets must 
not favor one faction or protect one contending group with greater vigor than 
another. Moreover, the protection or immunity that attaches to either White 
Helmet noncombatants or Blue Helmet neutrah is jeopardized wh erever they 
and Green Helmet combatants are unnecessar ily commingled physically. Blue 
Helmets cannot initiate the use of offensive military force and expect immunity 
from those th ey attack. Equally, Green Helmet combatants cannot hide behind 
a Blue shield when their rules  of engagement allow offensive use of nll itary 
weapons. 
A third requirement is that warring parties to the conflict truly consent, in 
good faith, to the presence and planned operatiom of the Blue H elmets. From 
48 
What Color Helmet? 
an internatio nal law standpoint , one of the consenting parties that must agree 
to the presence of the UN-sanctioned peacekeeping forc es is the legally 
recognized government of the host nation.  The Security Co uncil must not 
expect the Secretary-General to take on the role of an invading commander. 
For his part, when ho st nation consent is uncertain or unreliable , the Secretary­
General must insist that the peacekeeping operations include appropriate 
war-fight ers under natio nal command who are authorized by the Security 
Council to engage in the affirmative use of armed force .  If host nation c onsent 
is withdrawn, the UN Blue Helmets must leave the sovereign territory of the 
State  where they are no longer welcome. 
A fo urth requirement is that peacekeepers must have the means to implement 
the respective mandates they are given. UN forces must no t be seen as "paper 
tigers. " The institutional effectiveness of the United Nations to promote peace 
in the long term is seriously harmed when Blue Helmets are assigned missions 
they canno t actually perform. The Security Council ought to include Green 
Helmets in its mandates where enforc ement activities may arise. If the S ecre ­
tary- General does n o t  have the perso nnel, e quipment , and other support 
necessary to fulflll the Security Council mandate, he must refuse to accept the 
peacekeeping mission. The Secretary-General has a solemn duty not to accept 
"missio n imp ossible " mandates; he must insist upon an achievable mission, 
adequate reso urces and, if necessary, back-up forces supplied by Member States 
that are prepared for offensive military operations. Part of this po int is that the 
Unite d States and the o ther nations who are in the same category must pay 
their UN bills on time. Members in serious financial arrears ought to be 
restrained about requesting additional UN peacekeeping services . However, the 
essential concept is  that the United Nations, as an institution, must be genuinely 
prepared not only with the political will to "stay the course" but also with the 
financial resources to ensure that the required military personnel and equipment 
will be available to fulfill the mandate. The United Nations and Member States 
such as the United States must not take on peacekeep ing missions when the 
resources needed to achieve the mandate are in doubt.  Concisely expressed, it 
is better no t to go at all than to go and do badly. A related notion is that the 
United N ations simply cannot do all it wants to do any more than a national 
government can.  
A fifth requirement for a multin ational peacekeeping operation destined for 
a mixed setting is clear command and control over the respective groups 
deployed. The relationships be tween the White, Blue, and Green Helmets will 
be illustrated in the next section. To begin , written do cuments that provide fo r 
close coordination between those in charge of the humanitarian , traditional 
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peacekeeping and enforcement personnel must be in place in advance of 
deployment. One UN co mmander wearing a Blue Helmet must be in charge 
of all natio nal military co ntingents dedicated to a particular traditional 
peacekeeping operation .  An agreed upo n representative in the theater of 
operatio ns fo r all of the nongovernmental organizations involved in humani­
tarian assistance must be asked to sign o n  to the UN plan . If a White Helmet 
group is unwilling to sign such an agreement, the United Natio ns and its 
Member States should deny it any support whatso ever. Green Helmets , such as 
the regular military units in Nato , will undoubtedly have a single military officer 
commander who is empowered to act as commander fo r the combatants.  The 
point is that authority, responsib ility, and accountability fo r each helme t color 
must be cl early established at the o utset of any UN operation po tentially 
involving the use of force. 
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Seve ral M ixed Peacekeeping Sce narios 
U
N PEACEKEEPING PRACTICE has evolved over many years without 
articulation of a consistent and well-thought-out doctrine on the all-im­
portant issue of the use of fo rce.  Since peacekeeping op erations were launched 
as practical respon ses by th e  Unite d Nations to m eet urgent demands that the 
organization play a constructive role in defusing inter natio nal conflicts , the 
practice fo r multinatio nal ope rations under UN auspices developed case by case . 
A central thesis in this study is that , with clar ifications, the framework in the 
UN Charter provides an acceptable and workable basis for multinational 
peacekeeping op eration s. The point of view is that deficiencies in UN perfo rm­
ance are not due to a fundamentally flawed Charter but rather are due to a 
misapplication of pr inciples implicit in it. Th e most commo n  error with respect 
to issuing peacekeeping mandates has b een the failure of the Secur ity Council 
to dis tinguish clearly between cons ensual and coercive activities. From a legal 
point of view, the Charter is founded on consent from sovereign States. And 
co nsent is a crucial legal pr incipl e in its own right in all legal systems. In the 
cr iminal law, for instance,  the absence of co nsent can be the difference between 
lawful assisted suicide and unlawful murder. As a practical matter, the Security 
Council ough t to pursue a more rational and co nsistent ap proach fo r peacekeep­
ing activities within the existing framework, since amendment of the Charter is 
not only not imminent but also unnecessary. S everal hypo thetical scenario s  
follow that ar e  intended t o  illustrate h o w  peacekeeping practice might be 
conducted to comp ort  better with the UN Charter as  it i s  wr itten. Part o f  the 
assumptio ns in the scenarios is that peacekeep ing operations o ccur in a mixed 
setting between peace and war an d that Nato 's military capacity has been 
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expanded in some way to include Russia and other former Soviet Unio n 
natio ns. 
Traditio nal peacekeeping operations are frequently referred to as "Blue 
Helmet " operations, bec ause peacekeepers normally wear a blue covering on 
their heads to identify their affiliation with the Unite d Natio ns.  The operational 
co mman der of Blue Helmet forces is a regular military officer of a Member 
State who is temporar ily detailed to service under the UN Secretary-General . 
The Clinton administration's policy on "Reformin g  Multilateral Peace Op era­
tions," issued in May 1 9 94, places lead management and funding responsibility 
for u.s. partic�ation in Blue H elme t operations in the hands of the U. S .  State 
Department. 1 This policy de cisio n is consistent with the view advanced in th is 
study that UN forces sh ould be strictly co nfined to consensual operatio ns. 
Moreover, the author's view is that U.S. ground troops ought no t to be deployed 
as peacekeepers wearing Blue Helmets . Prior to the breakup of the S oviet 
Union, none of th e Permanent Members of the Security Co uncil served as 
traditional peacekeepers. This practice has many advantages , not the least o f  
wh ich i s  the strong desire i n  the U. S. Congress that Amer ican forces no t serve 
un der foreign commanders save for an unexpanded Nato. 
The ch aracterization "Green Helmets" is used in the scenarios that follow 
to refer to the conventional air, ground, and sea military forces that are 
maintained by most Member nations. The color green was selected because that 
is the typical color of the helmet worn by ground combat tro ops. " Green 
Helmet" is simply a shorthand fIgure of speech selected to denote the co nven­
tional military combatant forces of Member States whose actions are governed 
by the customary laws of arme d c onflict . The premise in this study is that Green 
Helmets are presumptively combat forces who do not perform traditional 
peacekeeping tasks . The traditio nal peacekeeping role would be played by Blue 
Helmets who serve concurrently in the same "mixed" consensual and c oercive 
co nflict area with Green H elmets. In the UN peacekeeping c ontext advan ced 
in this study, Gre en Helmet fo rces participating in a mixed multinational 
peacekeeping operation would report directly to the professional military 
officers in their chain of command. The Green Helmets would not report to a 
UN commander. Green H elmet commanders would be nationals of a Member 
State that is either part of a Unified Command operation mandated by the 
Security Council un der Chapter VII or a regional organization functioning in 
a c ollective security capacity, e .g. ,  OS eE/Nat o revise d  un der Chapter VIII. The 
Unifie d Command or regional organization would establish its respective chain 
of command as directed by the contributing nations. 
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The main idea is that for enforcement actions that would be conducted only 
by Green Helmets, a single chain of command would be set up by the nations 
themselves. This chain would be clearly designated on an agreed upon basis 
with policy guidance set at political level s , e .g. ,  North Atlantic Council or oseE .  
Formal reports from the military command in the theater of operation would 
flow through the designated chain of command for interface with the United 
Nations elements first at political levels. One or more accredited representatives 
from major contributing nations to a mixed operation wo uld report directly to 
the Security Council on the Green Helmet enforcement activities. As the 
mandate to enforce comes from the UN Charter, the contributing Members 
would have neither more nor less authority than that which the Security 
Council rightfully bestowed for the particular enforcement operat ions. To 
repeat, Green Helmets would not report formally to  the Secretary-General or 
to any of his appointed military commanders. By contrast, the Secretary-General 
would continue to report to the Secur ity Council on all Blue Helmet 
peacekeeping activities as he has tradit ionally done. A clear, political chain of  
command is absolutely necessary to  facilitate complete cooperation between 
Blue and Green Helmet military commanders in the area of potential hostilit ies. 
Likewise ,  there must be extensive coordination between Green and Blue units 
at the operational level in a mixed "war-peace" s.etting. The working assumption 
must be that there is agreement on the mission mandate and the respective roles 
to be played by the Blue and the Green Helmets. In the United States , the 
Defense Department has the lead responsibility for oversight ,  management, and 
financial support of all U.S. participation in Green Helmet operations.
1 6  
Again, 
this policy decision by the Clinton administration is consistent with the legal 
theory that Green Helmets are combatants who ought to be led by experienced 
military professionals . 
The term "White Helmets, "  as used in this study, refers to an eclectic 
assortment of civilians or other noncombatant groups who may be affiliated 
with UN peacekeeping operations in a mixed setting. The United Nations itself 
has numerous special ized agencies, such as the World Health Organization, that 
are often heavily engaged in humanitarian activities in combat zones. These 
organizations often work side-by-side in the field with nongovernmental enti­
ties, e .g . ,  the International Committee of the Red Cross. Customary law of war 
principles confer a protected status on  civilians, including media personnel , 
civilian contractors, and other noncombatants indirectly assoc iated with combat 
operations. Civilians who refrain from war-like act ivities are legally entitled to 
protected-person treatment that is consistent with their non-warlike activities. 
White Helmets will almost always be civilians, but could be military medical 
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doctors or nurses , fo r  instance , providing humanitarian assistance. When Blue 
or Green H elmets are temporarily tasked to directly support humanitarian 
activities ,  temporary rules pertaining to their status for the purposes of the 
p articular missio n should apply, as discussed below. 
Keeping in mind three categories-no ncombatants, neutrals, and c o mbatants 
that generally correspond to White, Blue, and Green H elmets-imagine th e 
following scenar io. A European Member of the Unite d Natio ns has been 
subjected to protracted civil strife with rival ethnic groups pitted against one 
ano ther. The armed conflict so metimes spills over to neighboring countries .  
The UN Secretary-General, with the support of several European regional 
organizations, brokers an uneasy truce .  The contending fo rces ,  including the 
legally reco gnized represen tatives of the host State that is a Member of the 
United Natio ns, sign a peace ac cord. Th e accord, in ter alia, invite s UN p eacekeep ­
ers into that country's sovereign territory t o  help with a de ter io rating human i­
tarian situatio n and to enforce the peace settlement as provide d  in the accord. 
The Security Council passes a resolution on the situation with three distinct 
mandate s. The fir st is that the Secretary- General is urged to facilitate humani­
tarian assis tance efforts and to support those who are engage d in UN-ap proved 
relief ac tivities .  The second is that the Secretary-General is asked to prepare a 
Blue Helmet op eratio n for th e host natio n that will be funded through the 
General Assembly. The Blue Helmets' missio n includes providing civilian 
policemen to assist in re-establishing do mestic law and order and military 
observers to monito r neutral zo ne s designated in the peace acc ord to separate 
the warring factions .  As traditional peacekeepers, the Blue Helmets are lightly 
armed and are autho rized to use deadly force only as a last resort for p erso nal 
or UI1lt self-defense. The third portion of the Security Co uncil mandate accep ts 
an offer from a European regional organization to lead and to fund a Unified 
Coalition of Member States who will provide the Green Helmets for th e 
operation in this mixed "war-peace" setting. The missio n of the Green Helmets , 
who will be drawn from a Nato plus other nations coalition,  is to enforce the 
peace accord that was signed by warring faction leaders. The Green Helmets 
may also respond to requests from the Blue H elmet commander to employ 
levels of force beyond the Blue Helmet's capabilities .  
Assume further that White, Blue, and Green H elmets are now on the ground 
in the host State 's terr itory as mandated by Security Council resolutions. Prior 
to the in-country deployment of either the Blue or Green Helmets, several 
agreements were executed.  An aid e  memo ire between the UN Secretariat and 
the tro op-co ntributing countries laid out the guidelines for assigning personnel 
and equipment for Blue Helmet service .  None of the Blue Helmets are from 
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a nation with permanent membership on the Se curity Co uncil.  A status of 
forces agreement (SOFA) between the United Nations and the host natio n 
representatives is reached that defmes the le gal relationships between the Blue 
Helmets and the host nation. In this case, a model S OFA on file with the 
Secretary-General had been incorpo rated by reference in the Peace Accord and 
declared provisio nally applicable.  It is stipulated that the Peace Accord was 
properly executed by appropriate political representatives in the host nation, 
including the government recognized by the States involved. The Peace Accord 
provides that Blue Helmet personnel will be entitled to the pr ivileges and 
immunities accorded " experts o n  missio n , "  i .e . ,  the status enjoyed by UN agents 
while engaged in offic ial duties. Supplementary administrative and op erating 
regulations tailored to this particular operation will be issued as circumstances 
require and time permits. The Blue and Green Helmet military commanders 
have jointly prepared and issued a combined strat egic operations plan that , inter 
alia, spells out compatible but clearly separate rules of engagement geared to 
their respective military roles. One important agreed upon rule is that the Green 
Helmets may only initiate offensive operations against forces deemed ho stile to 
the Blue Helmets when asked to do so by the Blue Helmet command. Once 
engaged in hostilities initiated at the request of the Blue Helmets ,  the Green 
Helmets will disengage either wh en the requested mission is accomplished, 
co nsistent with the safety of Green Helmets , or when the Blue Helmet 
command asks them to cease op erations. The Green H elmets have no obligation 
to cease operations in a way that is inconsistent with their customary law rights 
of self-defense. In fact, an important pr inciple expressed in the combined 
operatio ns plan is that neither Blue no r Green Helmet forces ever relinquish 
their inherent right and duty of individual or unit self-defense.  Lastly, a UN 
advance team had concluded memoranda of under standing (MO Us) with the 
Internatio nal Committee of the Red Cross and several o ther humanitarian 
groups active in th e ho st nation. These MOUs were directed primarily at 
practical ways to maintain the distinction betwe en the purely humanitarian 
activities of the White Helmets, the UN traditional peacekeep ing operations of 
the Blue Helme ts , and the UN enforcement actions of the Green Helmets . The 
MOUs also establish effective communication networks to ensure that there are 
practical means for close consultatio n  on humanitarian activities between the 
White and Blue Helmets on the one hand and close coordination on operational 
use of force matter s between the Blue Helmets and the Green Helmets on the 
other. 
A condition for UN support for the White Helmets is that they be present 
in the area of potential hostilities at the request of all co ntending factions in the 
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host nation . The White Helmets are likely to become engaged in activities such 
as in distr ibuting foo d  and providing medical assistanc e  throughout the host 
nation.  In these activities ,  the White H elmets may be ass isted from time to time 
by either Blue or Green Helmet military units. For example ,  the u.s. Army 
Corps of Engineers units serving as Green Helmets may make available to the 
White Helmets the personnel and material needed to build water purification 
facilities .  The u.s. Air Force may also provide C-1 7  aircraft to ferry supplies 
into the host nation to support the White H elmet humanitarian assistance 
efforts. 
The White Helmets consist of numerous organizations with various nationals 
from around the world. In this scenario, the Blue H elmet forces are drawn from 
the Netherlands , Norway, and Poland and are led by a Dutch br igadier general . 
The expanded Nato-led Green Helmet combatants are drawn from seven 
contributing nations, including Russia and the United States .  The commander 
in the host nation of these expan ded Nato -led forces is a national of France;  his 
deputy is a national of Russia. The Green H elmet air units are under the 
comb ined command of a United States Air Force officer. 
What is the status of the respective individuals participating in this mixed 
UN peacekeeping operation ?  What rules govern their use or nonuse of force? 
The White Helmet civilians are noncombatants who are entitled to the 
protections afforded in the Fourth 1 949 Geneva Convention Relat ive to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The White Helmets are not 
obligated to wear a uniform, but it is des irable that they take care to distinguish 
themselves from indigenous factions who may be lawful hostile fire targets .  The 
White Helmets should, in pr inciple, not carry ar ms or engage directly in 
combatant activities .  Their legal right to carry ar ms is the same as that of an 
ordinary citizen in the host nation who might car ry small arms strictly for 
personal self-defense. To avoid j eopardizing their protected per son status under 
international law, they should confme their activities to humanitarian work and 
not willingly become directly engaged in hostilities. Legally, the White H elmets 
are not to be captured or treated as combatants. Killing them deliberately is the 
crime of murder under the laws of the host nation and may be a grave breach 
of the laws of war under international law. 
The Blue Helmet troops that assist the White Helmets incur no change in 
legal status by render ing humanitarian assistance. They wear uniforms and c arry 
small arms openly. The main duty of all UN Blue Helmet peac ekeepers is to 
help all humanity in an impartial manner. Therefore, it is important that the 
Blue Helmets make every effort to treat all host nation groups impartially. After 
all , the Blue Helmets are representatives of the United Nations as a whole. The 
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UN Blue Helmet troops' arms are appropriate for the polic e-like functions and 
related neutral duties they undertake to perform with the prior consent of the 
host nation .  Likewise,  the SOFA rules conferring privileges and immunities for 
UN "experts on mission" apply to the Blue Helmets. Blue Helmets are not to 
be captured by hostile forces or treated as  prisoners of war. If  detain ed or taken 
into custody by ho stile forces, they are entitled to immediate release. 
Green Helmet forces, such as military engineers or cargo aircraft crews 
directly assisting White Helmets, also ought to have the same neutral status as 
Blue Helmet forces have, so long as these Green Helme ts are directly engaged 
solely in humanitarian activities. To be legally entitled to the privileges and 
immunities granted to Blue Helmets, however, the Green Helmets must assume 
the burdens that go with the benefits of that status. The SOFA must expressly 
confer Blue Helmet neutral status on Green Helmets while they are under 
orders to directly support humanitarian activities. During that time,  the Green 
Helmets should wear distinctive insignia on their helmets and uniforms to 
identify their temporary Blue Helmet status. If they comply, but are, nevertheless , 
captured, they are legally entitl ed to "expert on mission" status and are not to 
be treated as priso ners of war. Consistent with their status as neutrals, the arms 
that Green Helmet forces may c arry while rendering direct assistance to White 
Helmets must be comparable to what the Blue Helmets would car ry insofar as 
practicable. To remain entitled to Blue Helmet status , the Green Helmet 's 
vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and other equipment shoul d be clearly marked to 
indicate that they are temporarily engaged in noncombatant activities. Absent 
clear indications to the contrary, Green Helmets will be correctly presumed by 
hostile forces to be combatants. Th ere is , of course, no obligation on the part 
of Green Helmets to claim the status of Blue Helmets. They may elect to remain 
as combatants even while helping the White Helmets. In such a case, there is 
no issue ab out the extent of the military hardware carried. But, as such, th ey 
remain combatants and are prisoners of war if captured by hostile forces. White 
Helmets, however, may prefer that Green Helmet forces actually claim the status 
of (and wear the insignia of) Blue Helmets during humanitarian assistance 
activities, since Green Helmets may draw fire as le gitimate targets by ho stile 
forces even tho ugh directly engaged in humanitarian activities. The most 
important law of war principle to bear in mind throughout all the above 
circumstances is that the reason to maintain a clear distinction between 
combatants, neutrals and noncombatants is to protect noncombatants from 
ho stile use of force.  
Next, assume that a White Helmet motor transport convoy carrying food 
and medicine under the direction of a medical doctor from the UN World 
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Health Organization is en rou te to a geographic center from which human i­
tarian supplies are distributed to anyo ne in need. However, the center is located 
in a region of the host nation that is predominately inhabited by one of the 
warring ethnic groups. As a practical matter, this me ans that almost all of the 
humanitar ian assistance activitie s at the center inure to the benefit of one 
particular ethnic group. The convoy is stopped by a rogue band made up of 
paramilitary forces from another ethnic group that is  embittered by what they 
consider to be the human rights violations committed by individuals who are 
of the same ethnic group as the inhabitants near the distribution center. 
Providing supplies to the distribution center is seen by the rogues as a belligerent 
act that directly aids their enemies.  The convoy is  protected by Blue Helmets 
under the command of a Norwegian major, who rides at the front of the convoy 
in his white radio jeep that is prominently flying a UN flag. The drivers and the 
trucks transporting the supplies are from a Green Helmet unit on temporary 
detail from a Turkish military detachment. As authorized in the SOFA for this 
type of situation,  the Turkish troops wear blue plastic covers stretched over their 
green helmets and have plastic UN banners clearly displayed on their vehicles. 
The leader of the rogue band that surrounds the convoy demands that all the 
cargo and supplies be relinquished to his forces . 
For dealing with potential ho stilities ,  it was agreed by MOU in advance that 
the UN 's Norwegian Blue Helmet officer would assume command and co ntrol 
of the humanitarian convoy operation.  The United Nations is resp onsible for 
the safe passage of the White Helmets and for their shipment of humanitarian 
supplies. We may assume that the Turkish troops, who are openly assisting the 
White Helmets, have complied with the legal requirements detailed in the SOFA 
and MOUs. Accordingly, they are temporarily entitled to Blue Helmet  non­
combatant status while performing this humanitarian assistance role. Of course , 
the Turkish fo rces must continue to act like Blue Helmets to be entitle d to be 
treated like Blue Helmets. 
This situation illustrates why it is absolutely essential that Green Helmet 
troops,  who are highly trained for immediate reaction in combat situations, 
clearly understand their status and the applic able rules of engagement prior to 
the time that hostile inc idents arise. Assume in this c ase that the Norwegian 
major has an opportunity to negotiate with the leader of the rogue band. In 
addition to explaining carefully the noncombatant or neutral status of all the 
individuals for whom he is respon sible, the maj or points out that he is in radio 
communication with Green Helmets whose F-1 6  tactical support aircraft are 
circling overhead. He also informs the rogue commander that the route was 
planned in advance and, therefore ,  has pre-plotted targets . Part of the contin-
58 
What Color Helmet?  
gency planning for the convoy operation was that th e Gre en Helmets pro ­
grammed naval gunfire and heavy artillery on likely ambush sites suc h  as this. 
While the rogue band firepower may be superior to that of the Blue Helmet 
protection force, the Green Helmets are on stand-by to render rapid strike 
assistance if requested. The major explains that , unlike the Blue Helmets ,  the 
Green Helmets are ready and willing to engage, consistent with the laws of 
armed conflict, in all-out warfare against the rogue band. 
In the above sc enario, the Blue Helmet major may or may no t talk his way 
out of hostilities with the rogue band. But certainly his chances of avoiding 
conflict seem better by having ready recourse to th e Green Helmet's war-mak­
ing capability. If hostil ities ensue , in spite of the UN officer's effortS to avoid 
them, the Green Helmets are militar ily equipped to enforce the UN mandate 
by deadly use of force actions. This capability should help maintain respect for 
the overall UN peacekeeping efforts . Moreover, the hands of the Blue Helmet 
are kept morally "cleaner" than if the major were threatening to use force with 
his own Blue Helmets. Future contacts b etween the rogue 's ethnic allies and 
the Blue Helmets should no t be as confrontational as would be the case if the 
Blue Helmets were forced into either backing down or themselves en gaging in 
direct armed conflict. At the same time, the Green Helmets are, righ tly, more 
interested in rogue fe ar than friendship. The Green Helmet mind-set and mission 
remain clear. If calle d into combat, th ey are not confused ab out th eir mandate : 
their mission is to fin d and destroy the enemy. 
Assume another scenario. The Blue Helm ets' mission is  to provide security 
for a UN-designated "safe haven" where refugees may gather away from armed 
ho stilities to rece ive medical care , fo od, and related humanitar ian assistance .  At 
an earlier stage in the strife ,  th e principal leaders of the contending forces agreed 
to the establishment of this safe haven site. However, the Blue Helmet com­
mander now has reliable intelligence that armed force s comp osed of one ethnic 
group turned "rogue " are planning to launch an attack on the safe haven .  The 
camp is filled with refugees from an ethnic group who are mortal enemies of 
the armed forces expected to attack. In better times, UN political leaders had 
widely broadcast that the safe haven would be a san ctuary under UN protectio n 
for all refugee s  who fled there. The Blue Helmet commander lacks the troops 
and weapons to repel the attack. What can he do ? 
Assume that the political will exists in the Security Council and on the part 
of the Secretary-Gen eral to protect the refugee safe haven an d that the Green 
Helmets have received an appropriate urgent authorization to provide "all 
necessary means" of ass istance to the Blue H elmet commander. The Dutch Blue 
Helmet commander makes direct  contact with the French Green Helmet 
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comman der to request military assistance from the Gre en Helmets to defend 
the safe haven refu ge e site. At th e stage when "all necessary means" use offorce 
assistance is requested from the Green Helme ts, the Blue Helmets are obligated 
by MOUs to  provide all their available intelligence about ho stile forc es and the 
military situation pertaining to the camp. 
The Blue H elmet commander may tell the Gre en Helmet commander what 
the military force assistance mission is, but not  how the Green Helmets are to 
acc omplish it. Maintenance of a viable symbiotic relationship between the Blue 
and Green Helmets in mixed "war-p eace" settings is dependent upon cl ose and 
co ntinuous co ordination between the two forces. But the Green H elmet 
commander is under no obligation to risk his troops on missio n requests 
encumbered with unacceptable ter ms and conditions imp osed by the Blue 
Helmet commander. Likewise, the Blue H elmet commander should no t request 
assistance ifhe judges that the rogue group's likely reaction to the Green H elmet 
intervention outweighs the benefit of requesting combatant assistance. The 
nature of the agreed relationship is that the Blue Helmet commander requests 
the mission and the Green Helmet commander may accep t it or reject it . Ifhe 
accepts i t ,  the Green Helmet commander executes it as  he sees  fit  until the 
missio n is over. The point is that military necessity dictates that the ultimate 
selection of the means to ac complish a combatant mission is dec ided by the 
Green Helmet commander. 
Assume in this case that the mission portrayed by the Blue Helmet com­
mander is for the Green Helmets to protect th e safe haven refugee c amp from 
an anticipated attack by a rogue ethnic band. This mission assign ment is accep ted 
by the Green Helmet commander. 
The Green H elmet commander tasks a reinforced battalion of U. S.  Marines 
located on an offshore assault ship to undertake an urgent, initial deployment 
to commence accomplishment of the mission. Assume that this unit is forward 
deployed expressly to support UN operations as part of a Nato amphibious task 
force that is on station in the Mediterranean Sea. Within a few hours of receiving 
the missio n request,  co ntingent operations plans are appropr iat ely adapted, and 
the Marines are helicoptered to the safe haven site area in the host nation.  Within 
another few hours, the Marine s establish an outer defensive p er imeter around 
the Blue Helmet's inner se curity ring around the refugee camp. Additional 
equipment and personnel co ntinue to arr ive, including a British psychological 
operations unit that erects a large radio broadcast tower. This unit will concen­
trate o n  informin g the po pulace in the host nation of the reasons for the 
UN -sponsored military activities that are being undertaken with the consent of 
the le gitimate government. Six pieces of Russian h eavy artillery are brought in 
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by U. S.  Air Force C-1 7 aircraft , which are able to l and on the makeshift former 
commercial landing strip now secured within the Marines' defen sive per imeter. 
The Russian combat troops are under the command of a Russian artillery 
captain who reports through the single Green Helmet chain of command fo r 
all expanded Nato forces engaged in enforcement action in the host nation. 
Prior to deployment ,  Russian po litical representatives h ad agreed t o  the 
co ntribution of the Russian troops an d equipment for this operation. U. S. N avy 
and Marine close air support aircraft have been flying overhead since  accom­
panying the init ial helico pter assault forces into the combat area. I n  short , all of 
the usual warfighting activities necessary for a successful military operat ion are 
put into motion by th e military professio nals in the expanded Nato. One unusual 
co mmand and control aspect is that th e French Green Helmet commander, in 
addition to his deputy from Russia,  has at least one senior officer on his personal 
staff, either from each of th e nation s contributin g forces or their designated 
proxy. These officers are empowered to make recommendations, at any stage, 
to their respective national military commands regarding the co nduct of the 
comb at operations being conducted by exp anded Nato forces. Such recom­
mendations could include termination of that nation 's voluntary suppo rt of any 
UN enforcement action,  including this one, which is to pro tect the safe haven 
refugee camp. Part of th e advance agreement b etween the contributing Member 
States is that such withdrawal will not be implemented in a way that unduly 
jeo pardizes the l ives of other Nato fo rces continuing in the engagement . 
The Green Helmets will provide protection for the safe haven until aske d  to 
leave by the Blue Helmet commander o r by the lawful government of the host 
natio n. The Green Helmets would of course also leave when ordered to do so 
by the Green H elmet op erational commander. 
The Blue Helmet commander may decide that it is too risky to ask for Green 
Helmet assistance, and the Blue Helmets are under no obligation to  request 
assistance .  But it should b e  obvious that the Blue Helmets cannot accomplish 
their mission as mandated by the Security Council without the genuine 
cooperation of the armed factions in the h ost nation. When fac ed with ho stilities, 
the Blue Helmets retain the discretion to decide whether to stay in command 
and control . They may not want to pass operatio nal command and control to 
the Green Helmets. But once passed, forces hostile to the UN troo ps must 
understand that wh en the Green Helmets dec ide t o  use a particular type or  
amount of armed fo rce against an enemy. th at is  a matter between the Green 
Helmets and the enemy. The Blue Helmets are out of the decision lo op. Even 
without a Blue Helme t request , the Green Helmets are under no obligation to 
stand by helplessly and watch a slaughter of civilians or other inno cents. 
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including Blue Helmets. Green Helmet political lead ers may decide on their 
own to take hostile action against rogues, or any other enemy. But such use of 
force in the peacekeeping area of operations must be lawful either under the 
UN Charter, pursuant to Security Council mandate, or by agreement with the 
host State. To keep their status as a legitimate enforcement agent for the S ecurity 
Council, for example ,  the Green Helmets would be required to act within the 
legal parameters of the resolutions authorizing their involvement. If the UN 
mandate were too restrictive, the political leaders controlling an expanded 
Nato 's military forces should refuse to take the mission. They should also refuse 
missions where the mandate from the Security Council is ambiguous. 
In the above scenarios,  the Blue and Green H elmets' use of armed force is 
consist ent with the UN Charter as well as with accepted conventional and 
customary international law. The troops know their status-if in doubt,  they 
can check the color of their helmets. Blue Helmets are not neutrals one moment 
and combatants the next. Likewise, Green H elmets are combatants unless they 
carefully comply with previously agreed up on ar rangements negotiated with 
the host nation whereby they may temporarily enj oy "expert  on mission" status. 
Equally important ,  all others,  including potential hostile forces, should be able 
to readily identify the status of individuals and their equipment. If rogue forces 
kill a White or  Blue Helmet,  this is the domestic crime of murder with only 
the defenses and mitigation  permitted under the judicial system of the host 
nation. The ac t may also be a war crime within the jurisdictional competence 
of an international cr iminal court. If rogue forces kill a Green Helmet in combat , 
it is not  murder anymore than it is murder if one of the rogue forces is killed 
by the Green Helmets. Both are full-fledged combatants whose conduct is 
governed by the laws of armed conflict. The principle is that establishing a clear 
status for different categories of troops in mixed hostilities is indispensable 
consider ing the legal consequences that follow from that status. 
From the point of view of command and control, Blue Helmets are ultimately 
responsible to the Secretary-General who, in turn, on traditional peacekeeping 
missions, reports to the Secur ity Council. The Secretary-General is also ac­
co untable to the General Assembly, who must pay the bills for the peacekeeping 
operations he supervises. By contrast , the Green Helmet chain of command 
flows through a Unified or Coalition commander, probably designated by Nato, 
perhaps under a regional organization such as the OSCE. The O S CE qualifies 
as a regional collective security organization that is entitled, under Art icle 53 
in  Chapter VII I  of the UN Charter, to assist the Security Council in carrying 
out Chapter VII enforcement actions. Nato does not presently so qualify, but 
the North Atlantic Treaty could be re-negotiated to allow this legal possib ility. 
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An interesting var iation is that Nato could serve as one entity contributing 
forces to a newly created Chapter VII I  collective security arrangement for the 
North Atlantic region .  The other contributing entitie s could be expanded Nato 
member States particip ating in their individual , as distinguished from their 
co llective , capacity. From a domestic perspective, this wo uld entail obtaining 
the advice and co nsent of the United States Senate.  To elaborate:  it is not 
unlawful from the perspective of international law for Nato to be used as a 
Chapter VI I I  regional enforcement organization so lo ng as the activities are 
approved by the Nato heads of State or their agents. At the same time, it is not 
lawful under the domestic Constitutional pro cesses in the United States to use 
Nato as a Chapter VI I I  co lle ctive security organization witho ut obtaining the 
advice and consent of the U. S. Senate.  As is evident from the text of its Article 
5, the Senate only approved the North Atlantic Treaty as an Article 5 1 , Chapter 
VI I self-defense organization. 
The legal rules governing peacekeeping operations in mixed "war-peace " 
settings are not easy to unravel ,  but they can be sorte d out with clear thinking 
and mental discipline on the part of political leaders. The S ecretary-General 
can serve as an even-handed representative of all sovereign Me mbers, and 
traditional peacekeeping that has been successful when done properly can 
co ntinue un der the UN Charter as written . There is little that is unusual ab out 
the combine d-color Helmet operations described in this study except the 
no tion that the Blue Helmet commander has the author ity to withdraw his 
request for Green Helmet assistance on missions undertaken at Blue Helmet 
requ est.  
As no ted earlier, in the United State s, th e Department of D efense , pursuant 
to the May 1 994 presidential decision,  has le ad management and funding 
responsibility for U. S. participation in Green H elmet operations, whether they 
oc cur under traditional peacekeeping or enforcement action mandates from the 
Security Council. Significantly, the approach suggested in this study does not  
co ntemplate U N  funding for Green Helmets, who se actions are focused almost 
exclusively on enforcement. The costs of Green Helmets are to be paid by the 
contributing Members who must also pay their UN-determined share to other 
nations who provide tro ops for traditional UN peacekeeping Blue H elmet 
operations. It is exp ected that the approach outl ined in this study will discourage 
the United Nations from overreaching into risky and expensive ventures with 
traditional peacekeepers, as the policy of the Security Council will b e  to leave 
enforcement to Member State forces who do not repo rt to the Security Council 
thro ugh the Se cretary-General . 
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On e downside to this approach is that the Unite d S caces and o cher States 
with the ability to influence Security Council mandates paid by the United 
Nations would have to pay for the enforcement actions they support out of 
their national budgets. In addition ,  th e lives laid on the line for UN enforcement 
operations would be those of nationals from the Member States whose military 
services would be do ing the enforcing. The perceived advantage of cost-sharing 
for enforcement operations from Germany, japan, and other UN Members in 
general would be lost.  Still , the net effect of the approach is that the United 
Nations as such would be kept away from enforcement op erations it cannot 
afford and should not be involved in anyway. An additional result under this 
approach is that the United States and other nations contributing Green 
Helmets would be discouraged from entering into enforcement operations.  
Certainly, the  U.S. Congress would h ave more input into Green Helmet 
decisions than it does n ow when there is confusio n about whether the 
comm.itment is for a Blue or Green Helmet operation. From the perspective 
of the United States,  any Administration is less likely to commit U.S. military 
forces to Green Helmet operations without consultation with Congress. The 
mere fact that such consultation will occur is likely to act as a brake on the 
comm.itment of forces overseas. 
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Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates 
�HE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD return to the basic principles in the 
Jl UN Charter an d apply its provisions regarding use of force clearly and 
co nsistently with resp ect to all peacekeep ing operations. I n  doctr ine an d 
application ,  personnel should have no c o nfusion about their roles:  White 
Helmets are unarme d noncombatants; Blue Helmets are lightly armed neutrals; 
and Green Helmets are fully armed combatants. Civil ians may command White 
Helmets; the Secretary-General's military commander may command Blue 
Helmets; and a UN-approved Member-State co alition or regional colle ctive 
security organizatio n 's military commander may command Green Helmets. 
The structure of the UN Charter provides  fo r a gradual escalation from 
low-key preventive dipl omacy by the Secretary-General to full-scale offensive 
military action (when authorized by the Security Co uncil) by Member States 
to maintain international peace an d se curity. The Security Council is o bligated 
to exhaust Chapter VI me asures before invokin g " Chapter VI and a half' 
traditio nal peacekeeping actions. Chapter VII enforcement measures are to be 
led by collective security alliances consisting of Member S tates,  not  by the 
Secretary-General . The North Atlantic Treaty needs to be ren ego tiated before 
Nato is legally empowered under U. S. law to act o ther than as an Article 5 1  
self-defense force in the current p arties '  terr itories. I n  any eve n t, the role o f  the 
Secretary-Ge neral is consistent with the UN Charter when limited to traditio nal 
peacekeeping. The Security Council has a responsibility to provide sufficiently 
clear guidance so that agreed up on rules of en gagement detail the exact 
circumstances under which military armed force is authorize d in all UN 
operatio ns. The need for co nsistent UN use of fo rce doctrine has never been 
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greater, given th e current trend to lace together diverse coalitions with both 
police and combatant functions that are expected to be performed in mixed 
"war-pe ace " settings. Moreover, to cope with the greater number of regional 
conflicts since the end of the Cold War, the United N ations is likely to make 
greater use of Chapter VI I I  regional peacekeepers. Truly combined multina­
tional forces,  with rapid response capabilities, are emerging to meet that need 
in the Nato context. Proper Secur ity Council mandates should draw a br ight 
line between UN command and control for traditional self-defense peacekeep­
ing and national command an d control for offensive enforcement actions. 
Fifty years after its founding, the United Nations has reached ano ther 
threshold. UN credibility with respect to international peace and security is 
being challenged at a time when the opportunity to fulftll the commitments in 
the UN Charter are the best since the end of World War II. There is also a 
pressing need for greater selectivity in undertaking UN peacekeeping missions. 
The UN's financial cr isis is ser ious and will simply wo rsen when the United 
States reduces its share of funding to a more realistic 25 percent contr ibution. 
A major problem in peacekeeping is that both the Secretary-General and the 
Security Counc il must learn to "just say no. "  Each must restrict itself to roles 
and missions that are consistent with the legal requirements in the UN Charter. 
The United Nations must face its limitations realistically, and Member States, 
particularly the United States ,  must disc ipline themselves to seek only achievable 
go als. 
Prominently, the UN Charter expressly prohibits intervention in the do mestic 
affairs of sovereign States. The Clinton administration conceptually came to 
grips with the problem of when to support a peacekeeping operation in its May 
1 994 policy announcement . After listing a collection of factors such as national 
interest, threat to the peace, clear objectives and the like, the Administration 
stated that it would apply even str icter standards for U. S.  participation in what 
amounted to an enforcement action operation, i. e . , r isking combat. This is sound 
policy, but it needs to be implemented in deeds as well as in words. The Secur ity 
Council cannot afford to take enforcement action in every nation where there 
are significant human r ights violations or a defective form of demo cratic 
government. In fact, these defects have always existed in a majority of the 
Member States in the United Nations. The organization r ightfully lacks the 
political will and the resources to deal with these matters on a co nsistent basis 
throughout the globe. 
The Secur ity Council must institute a more selective review pro cess for both 
the operational activities and financial aspects of its peacekeeping mandates. Far 
to o often th e Security Council has too readily, almost automatically, extended 
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or expanded peacekeep ing mandates.  The Security Council should terminate 
peacekeeping missions outright when domestic factions lack the po litical will 
to live in peace without UN pe acekeepers. The notion ought to be accepted 
th at domestic armed conflicts h ave a cycle that must be run until the hostile 
forces want to stop fighting. Premature involvement by the United Nations may 
yield short-ter m gains but is highly unlikely to be successful in the long run . 
In some instances, the Unite d Natio ns has assumed virtually a permanent 
presenc e in host nations akin to that of an occupying power, even when 
individual Members can be easily iden tified as sponsors of one or another 
warring faction. Let the State sponsors of the conflict pay fo r the UN presence 
or pull the pe acekeepers out. If ne cessary, the Se curity Council can utilize its 
mandatory powers to impose p olitical and financial accountability on individual 
Members th at support threats to international peace and security. While this 
tough-minded approach may lead to the extraction of UN fo rces from places 
such as Cyprus, it will also, for example,  place responsibility for that crisis 
squarely on the nations respo nsible : Turkey and Greece .  The Security Council 
and Nato have the political and military means to deal with whatever may arise 
as a result of closing down the UN o ccupation there. As it is, the world 
community is fo o ting the bill for a bilate ral problem which neither offending 






HE UN CHARTER IS  FAR FROM PERFECT, b u t  it  i s  the most imp ortant 
agreement that the world has ever concluded to constrain aggressive war. 
With the thaw in the Cold War, a fleeting window of opportunity has opened 
to follow the Charter on se curity issues almost as originally int ended fifty years 
ago. Unfortunately, overreaching by the Secretary-General, lack of discipline by 
political leaders in the United States and elsewhere, as well as other factors,  have 
caused the essential le gal distinction between co nsensual and coercive measures 
to be blurred. The post-Cold War reality is that UN-sponsored forc es are likely 
to be placed in mixed "war-peace" settings involving ethnic strife where several 
categories of peacekeep ers must deal simultaneously with a spectrum of 
activities ranging from humanitarian assistance to enforcement action. The 
author's view is that Blue Helmets should always restrict themselves to tradi­
tional peacekeeping and that conventional war-fighters from Member States 
should presumptively retain their status as full combatants. Only when circum­
stances in the fiel d  require Green Helmets to serve in a support capacity under 
Blue Helmet command sho uld the Green H elmets become legally entitled to 
temporary st atus as UN "experts on mission . "  The principal conclusion ad­
vanced is that the all-important distinction laid out in the UN Charter between 
self-defense and enforcement use of force categories can, and should, be 
maintained. Finally, while the UN Charter suffices as written as a legal basis for 
generic peacekeeping activitie s (once properly distinguished) , the North Atlan­
tic Treaty has clearly been overtaken by post-Cold War events.  A new No rth 
American-European collective security scheme should reconstitute Nato to  
allow i t  to function ,  as  in the past , as  an Article 5 1  self-defense organizatio n  
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under Chapter VII ,  but also as a contributor entity itself to a Chapter VII I  
collective security agency mandated by the  Security Council. 
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Atlantic Alliance's Rapid Response Corps 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Council on the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (renamed OS CE) 
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the Dominican Republic 
Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire 
Monitoring Group 
European Union 
French-German WEU forces 
French, Italian,  Spanish, and Portuguese WEU forces 
All-Member Maritime Force (WEU) 
Frente Farabundo Marti Para la Liberacion Nacional 
Implementation Force 
International Police Task Force 
UN Mission for the Ver ification of Human Rights and of 
Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Hu­
man Rights in Guatemala 
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
Memorandum of Understanding 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council Ad Hoc Group 
Organization of African Unity 
Operation des Nations Unies au Congo 
UN Observer Group in Central America 
UN Operation in Mozambique 
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (for­
merly CSCE) 
Party of Democratic Kampuchea 
Frente Popular Para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y de 
Rio de Oro 
Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana 
Rwandese Patriotic Front 
Security Council Resolution 
Stabilization Force (successor to IFOR) 
UN Advance Mission in Cambodia 
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group 
UN Angola Verification Mission I 
UN Angola Verification Mission II  
UN Angola Verification Mission III 
UN Confidence Restoration Operation (in Croatia) 
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UNDOF 
UNEF I 
































UN Disengagement Observer Force 
UN Emergency Force I (1 956-1 967) 
UN Emergency Force II  (1 973- 1 979) 
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group 
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 
UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission 
National Union for the To tal Independence of Angola 
Unified Task Force 
UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
UN Mission in Haiti 
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
UN Mission of Observers in Taj ikistan 
UN Observation Group in Lebanon 
UN Observer Mission in Georgia 
UN Observer Mission in Liberia 
UN Observer Mission in South Africa 
UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda 
UN Operation in Somalia 1 (1 992-1 993) 
UN Operation in Somalia II (1 99 3- 1 995) 
UN Protected Area 
UN Confidence Restoration Operations in Croatia (UN ­
CRO) ; UN Preventive Deployment force (UNPREDEP) 
within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and 
UNMIBH in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
UN Preventive Deployment Force 
UN Protection Force 
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
UN Transitional Administration fo r Eastern Slavonia, 
Baranja, and Western Sirmium 
UN Transition Assistance Group 
UN Security Force serving as a Temporary Executive 
Authority (and security force) 
UN Truce Supervisio n  Organization 
UN Yemen Observation Mission 
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca 
Western European Union 
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